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"Everybody is presumed to know the law except His Majesty's judges,
who have a Court of Appeal set over them to put them right."$U DER THE COMMON LAW, error juris-ignorance or mistake of law'-
is no defense to a criminal prosecution. The same rule prevails in
most civil law systems. But in ancient law error of law was a de-
fense, and this defense has been revived in several modern legal systems.
Grant or denial of that defense, we believe, should be determined not as an
independent issue but rather as part of the comprehensive problem of criminal
responsibility: Why should a human being be subjected to sanctions when he
commits an act proscribed by law? Solution of this problem includes an
answer to the question whether or not sanctions should be applied where the
act is committed in ignorance or mistake of law. We believe that the tradi-
tional approach to the problem of criminal responsibility is wrong. Indeed,
most writers have grasped but a partial aspect of that problem. The question
as usually posed-"is man responsible? "2 -is incomplete. Professor Phillip
Frank has suggested that a correct scientific formulation of the statement,
"my head is above my feet," would be: "My head is above my feet relative to
* This paper is based in part on research conducted by Mr. Ryu for a Commentary on the
Korean Criminal Code, and by Miss Silving for the Harvard Law School-Israel Cooperative
Research for Israel's Legal Development. The views expressed, however, are solely those of
the authors. Translations from foreign language sources are also those of the authors.
t Professor of Law, Seoul National University, Seoul, Korea.
-ff Professor of Law, University of Puerto Rico.
t Note 72 infra.
1 Consult Keedy, Ignorance and Mistake in Criminal Law, 22 Harv. L. Rev. 75 (1908).
'The A.L.I. Model Penal Code, Tentative Draft No. 4, at 27 (1955), identifies "criminal
responsibility" with mere absence of incapacitating mental disease. We view this term more
broadly than absence of any specific incapacities. Consequently, we shall deal only inci-
dentally with error of law induced by mental disease. Consult Hall, Psychiatry and Criminal
Responsibility, 65 Yale L. J. 761-85 (1956).
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the gravity of my place." Similarly, the question "is man responsible?"
should be formulated in relation to the sanction which that responsibility im-
plies and to the "why" of that sanction. This relational meaning of responsi-
bility is the backbone of any solution to the problem of error juris.
At one time in Europe the meaning of criminal responsibility was the sub-
ject of vigorous philosophical controversy involving a dispute between free
will and determinism. The classical school, assuming the existence of free will,
identified responsibility with moral "guilt." Criminological positivism, 4 on the
other hand, denied the existence of free will and its attendant concept of
moral guilt, subordinated the individual to society and thought of responsibil-
ity in terms of dangerousness to society which warranted the application of
social defense measures. 5 The controversy has since been taken up by Ameri-
can jurists and psychiatrists.6 We shall not debate the problem of free will, as
conceived in philosophy, because this problem has no operational meaning
within the issue of criminal responsibility.7 Any legal or social approach to
responsibility implicitly shifts that problem to a practical level. However,
criminological positivists claim that determinism is not merely a philosophical
proposition but a scientifically established fact which disproves the existence
of free will. This claim completely confuses the issues involved in the dispute
between free will and determinism by identifying "chance" in the natural
sciences with "free will" in ethics (non-determinism with free will) and causal-
ity with prediction in the natural sciences.8 Moreover, the law is neither a
'Frank, The Relativity of Truth and the Objectivity of Values, Third Symposium of the
Conference on Science, Philosophy and Religion 12, 14-15 (1945). The rest of the quoted
passage reads: "and my feet are above my head relative to the gravity at the place of my
antipodes." Ibid.
' Criminological positivism-the theory which assumes that man's actions are causally de-
termined so that moral condemnation is meaningless-should not be confused with jurispru-
dential positivism, which denies the existence of natural law. We do not delve into the intri-
cate jurisprudential controversy between the theory of natural law and that of positive law.
While elements of this controversy importantly bear on our problem, their thorough analy-
sis is beyond the scope of this article. We shall deal with it only when discussing the subject
concerning which the accused has erred.
'Ferri, Criminal Sociology 353-54 (Modern Criminal Science Series IX, 1917).
' Consult Weihofen, Mental Disorder as a Criminal Defense 483 (1954), where it is said
that "[t]oday ... instead of concentrating on whether the accused had sufficient knowledge
or will power to be held 'responsible,' or 'guilty' the new approach would start with the
proposition that the individual's social dangerousness and not his moral blameworthiness
is an essential criterion."
What possible functional meaning would it have in the theory or practice of criminal
law to argue, for example, whether the concept of free will is a hypothesis or an a priori
assumption of ethical science? Moreover, there are areas of criminal law to which the con-
cept of free will cannot be applied, e.g., the growing area of public welfare crimes.
8They overlook the significance of time in physical causation and fail properly to evaluate
the fact that prediction even in physical causation can be understood only in terms of proba-
bility. For a clear concept of causality see Margenau, The Nature of Physical Reality 389-
426 (1950) ; Northrop, The Logic of the Sciences and the Humanities 200-234 (1947).
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science nor a mere reflection of scientific opinion. Since it sets forth rules of
conduct, in order to utilize scientific knowledge it must first transform that
knowledge into a social ideology. The latter, in turn, necessarily carries impli-
cations which reach far beyond the scientific basis on which it is built. Even
if determinism were a scientifically proven fact, that fact alone would not
warrant the conclusion drawn from it by criminological positivists that the
individual is subordinated to society and that responsibility is determined by
the yardstick of social dangerousness.9 Belief in the supremacy of society pre-
supposes a political orientation which is to a large extent independent of
alleged scientific fact finding. Stress on social purpose, if carried out con-
sistently, leads to a social ideology of totalitarianism and paternalistic ab-
sorption of the individual by the state.' 0
We proceed from a different ideology: We believe in a "free society" that
recognizes human dignity as an ultimate goal. We do not consider freedom
either in the Kantian transcendentalist sense or in the purely semantic ver-
sion of eighteenth and nineteenth century liberalism, as the "absolute value
of the human personality,"" to be meaningful. Rather, proceeding from the
idea of human dignity in a "free society,"' 2 we inquire into the meaning and
scope of a "responsibility" that might best fit that frame of reference.
The problem of "responsibility" thus conceived calls for answers to two
questions: For what is man responsible? What sanctions does responsibility
imply in any given case? Answers to these questions afford the resolution of
the problems of error juris. We shall survey the historical evolution of error
of law as a defense, state the contemporary problems of that defense, clarify
the points in issue and, finally, present our own position on the theory and
policy of criminal responsibility and its corollary, error juris.
I. HISTORICAL SuRvEY
That which rendered man responsible in early law was disobediencce of pre-
vailing religious or social precepts. Where disobedience of law ceases to be
'Even if we could draw such conclusion from the alleged factual absence of free will, we
would not thereby exclude legal "responsibility" in the sense of amenability to the state's
interference with individual freedom, but merely predicate it upon danger to society rather
than upon individual guilt.1 Ferri, op. cit. supra note 5, at 353-54, says: "It suffices for my purpose to say that the
natural and positivist moral sciences coincide in demonstrating that the individual, what-
ever be his species, does not exist only as such in himself, but rather as a member or element
of a society." Ferri claims that his ideology has decisively influenced the Soviet interpre-
tation of criminal law, but this is denied by the Soviets. Consult Berman, Principles of
Soviet Criminal Law, 56 Yale L. 3. 803, 804 n. 9 (1947).
' Hallowell, The Decline of Liberalism as an Ideology 1-12 (1946).
'
2 Lasswell, Power and Personality 125 (1948). Consult also Lasswell and McDougal,
Legal Education and Public Policy: Professional Training in the Public Interest, 52 Yale
L. 3. 203 (1943); McDougal, The Comparative Study of Law for Policy Purposes: Value
Clarification as an Instrument of Democratic World Order, 61 Yale L. J. 915 (1952).
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merely a formal inconsistency with such precepts and assumes psychological
connotations, it implies an attitude of defiance, disregard or contempt of law.
Defiance of law, of course, presupposes awareness of it. Knowledge of law is
hence a necessary requisite of legal guilt.
The offender's knowledge of the law is also implicit in any moral value
judgment of guilt applied to his act. The criminal is blamed for his act be-
cause in it he expressed an attitude of opposition to law, a refusal to accept
the moral tenet of the law. The moral right to punish flows from an evaluation
of the criminal act as an act by which the offender sets up his own morality-
or immorality-against the morality of the punishing social system. Thus,
punishment requires that the offender knew and defied the law. Knowledge of
law as a moral requisite of crime and punishment is not a peculiarity of early
law but is part, theoretically at least, of all law which purports to be identical
with, or based upon, morality. While this may be observed most clearly in the
modern development of canon and natural law, it is also apparent in the other
systems which are discussed below.
The Law of the Bible
,The Bible contains only a few references to error or ignorance of law. It
occasionally describes lack of intent as a lack of knowledge.' 3 Beyond that, in
discussing atonement for sins, it draws a distinction between sins committed
erroneously or in ignorance and "high-handed" sins.14 The person acting in a
"high-handed" manner is said to have "despised the word of the Lord." This
distinction would seem to indicate that ignorance of "the word" excludes in-
tentional sin. Ignorant or erroneous sinning calls for no punishment except a
sacrifice in atonement.
The Law of the Talmud
In the Babylonian Talmud,15 Seder Nezikin deals with the question of
whether or not the children of Noah were bound to observe the law, unless
they were previously instructed as to the legal precepts and had accepted
them.'0 Warning of the legal consequences of committing an offense is re-
peatedly stated to be a requisite of punishment. Criminals cannot be executed
"unless... [they were] cautioned by two who witnessed the crime," and un-
less "the warners have let them know that they are liable to a death sentence
at the hand of the Court."'1 7 According to R. Judah, the warners must also
inform them of the kind of death they would suffer.' 8 The Talmud, indeed,
'E.g., Deuteronomy IV, 42; IX, 4.
"Leviticus V, 18; Numbers XV, 22-31.
'" References to the Babylonian Talmud are to the translation made under the editorship
of Rabbi Dr. I. Epstein (Soncino Press, 1936).
" 1 ibid., at 384-85. '7 Ibid., at 38. ' Ibid., at 36.
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devotes elaborate thought to the question whether "a warning of a greater
penalty is ipso facto a warning for a smaller one too," and to the question
which of two types of execution constitutes a "greater penalty."' 9 The require-
ment of prior warning is not limited to capital crimes, but applies also to
other penalties, such as flagellation or imprisonment.2 0 Since the warning re-
quirement is only part of a general principle that no crime can exist without
consciousness of illegality, learned men need not be warned.2 '
Roman Law
The well-known adage, error juris nocet, error facti non nocet, is derived
from the Digests.2 2 But, as convincingly shown by Binding,2 3 it was never
applied by the Romans to the field of criminal law. Linguistic considerations
support Binding's view. The term nocet (from nocere-to damage, to preju-
dice) is not conventionally used with regard to an accused in a criminal case.
When applied to an accused, the adage would have a rather awkward mean-
ing, that is, he is "damaged" by his error. Nor does it seem likely that the
Romans would have used, in such context, the ambiguous term jus (meaning
either law or right) rather than the clearer term lex. That jus was, in this sec-
tion of the Digest, intended to mean "right" may be concluded from the fact
that the section deals with the impact of error on acquisition and forfeiture of
various private rights. Binding, indeed, argues that even within the area of
civil law, the rule that ignorance of law constitutes a disadvantage was limited
to certain specific situations, all involving private rights. He relies heavily on
the fact that in a fragment of the above section, the phrase used is error juris
sui (error as to his right) rather than error juris.2 4 Equally persuasive is Bind-
ing's further argument that the distinction made between error of law and
error of fact did not have, in the Digests, the same connotation that is attrib-
uted to it today. According to him, error of law meant only error arising from
misconception of the particular lex or "edict" that granted the right in issue,
and error of fact meant any other error, including error as to any other law.
As demonstrated by Binding, the Roman criminal law always regarded
knowledge of illegality, indeed, a positive disregard or contempt of the law, as
an essential requisite of dolus mnalus (intent) or culpa lata (gross negli-
gence). 2 Thus Roman law resembles Biblical law. Medieval commentators on
2 ibid., at 535-36. ' Ibid., at 540.
n Ibid., at 494; 1 ibid., at 37.
Digest 22.6 (De iuris et facti ignorantia).
"3 Binding, Die Normen und ihre tbertretung 30-79 (1918).
"Digest 22.6.3.
1 Binding, op. cit. supra note 23, at 56. It has been frequently noted that in Roman law
certain classes of persons, that is, minors, women, peasants and soldiers could rely on error
of law. But, as shown by Binding, ibid., at 61, such persons received no exceptional treat-
ment in criminal law. Whatever exceptions applied in their case were limited to civil law.
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the Roman law interpreted that law as excluding dolus in the absence of
knowledge of law but admitting culpa lata in case the error was inexcuse-
able.26 Nor did they ever admit any general presumption of dolus but con-
ceded merely that in certain situations the error is more credible than in
others.
27
Since the Roman law of civil error-though in a grossly misconceived form
-largely determined all later developments, it is proper to add a few words
on two aspects, reflected in the later development of the division of error of law
and error of fact and in the distinction between innocent and guilty error.
Digest 22.6 seems to contain the roots from which the later division of error
into error of law and error of fact, excusable and inexcusable, vincible and
invincible error, evolved. It has been suggested that the Digest's reason for
distinguishing error of law from error of fact (the former allegedly inexcusable,
the latter excusable) was that "the law is certain and capable of being ascer-
tained, while the construction of facts is difficult for even the most circum-
spect."'28 But the Digest fragment2 9 which allegedly so holds, contains no such
sweeping statement. Rather, it seems to suggest that "to the extent that the
law is, can be and should be, fixed," error as o it should not be treated "in
all respects" like an error of fact, as to which even the most circumspect can
err. Another fragment"0 contains the terms, supina ignorantia and negligentia
crassa, which acquired decisive significance in the canon-law theory of error.
This fragment, in stating that neither supine ignorance nor crass negligence,
even as to facts, is excused,31 merely suggests a proper standard of care in
seeking knowledge.
When read together, these passages obviously do not suggest that error of
Ibid., at 57.
Binding concluded that application of the civil law theory of error of law to the field of
criminal law was entirely the product of advanced German doctrine. In his view, it was that
doctrine which also originated the idea of a presumption of intent, including the presump-
tion of knowledge of law. He attributes this to the growing disregard of the person of the
accused following the rise of absolute state power. 3 ibid., at 70-71, 78-79. While it is true
that the doctrine of error juris nocet assumed its rather dogmatic character in the atmos-
phere of absolute state power, that doctrine was certainly known prior to the rise of that
power in Europe.
' Keedy, Ignorance and Mistake in Criminal Law, 22 Harv. L. Rev. 75, 78 (1908).
Digest 22.6.2. o Ibid., at fragment 6.
Ibid. Fragments 7 and 8, suggest that ignorance of law and of fact are treated different-
ly depending on whether such ignorance arises in the context of acquisition or in the context
of forfeiture of rights, of making a profit or of preserving an existing right. Then follows
the famous fragment 9, containing the reguda. That passage simply states, citing examples,
that no one may derive an advantage from ignorance of the law and that ignorance of fact
does not prejudice anyone. In section 3 the passage reports an opinion of Labeo to the
effect that the rule excluding advantage based on legal error applies only to a person who
can secure the advice of jurisconsults or who is in possession of sufficient self-enlightenment.
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fact is equated with excusable and error of law with inexcusable error. Ex-
cusable error was viewed rather as a product of two elements: the difficulty
presented by the object of knowledge and the effort exerted in the process of
cognition. With regard to the object, the Romans seemed to believe that law
can and should be fixed, whereas facts tend to be more elusive. Owing to the
greater elusiveness of facts, error as to them should be excused more readily
so that only supine ignorance or crass negligence should bar excuse.32 That
the Romans never thought in terms of a rigid demarcation line between error
of law and error of fact, is suggested by phrases such as in facto nzagis, quam
in jure errat (he erred more as to fact than as to law),38 indicating a differ-
ence in degree rather than in kind. A misconception of this Roman doctrine
of error later led to the assumption of a rigid division into error of fact and
error of law.34
Canon Law
While repeating the spurious Roman law principle that ignorance of law
constitutes no excuse, the canon law early provided that general censures im-
posed by the ordinaries did not bind those who were unaware of them, unless
the ignorance stemmed from laziness or gross negligence. 35 Canonist doctrine,
which had been concerned with the question of error of law since the four-
teenth century, extended this specific provision to all criminal law, invoking,
as subsidiary ground of the extension, the doctrine that no one could be
punished unless "guilty." The old law, reading "ignorance of the fact excuses,
ignorance of the law does not excuse,"136 is now interpreted restrictively as
merely invalidating or disqualifying law; the present Canon 16, Section 1,
providing that ignorance of such law does not excuse non-observance, implies
merely that an act performed contrary to such law is invalid regardless of
ignorance or error.37 But with regard to crime, the canon law follows the
teaching of Aquinas that a precept does not oblige "unless the command
reaches him who is commanded; it thus reaches him however through knowl-
32The required standard of care lies between excessive indifference and the curiosity (in-
quisitiveness) of a spy or an informer. Digest 22.6.6.
Ibid., at 22.6.1.2.
The Lex Visigothorium and the Lex Burgundionum contain interesting provisions deal-
ing with the responsibility of judges who, owing to error of law, incorrectly decide a case.
Consult 3 Binding, op. cit. supra note 23, at 23 et seq. Binding also cites a number of thir-
teenth to fifteenth century German folk laws and city ordinances which contain special rules
for aliens, who cannot be expected to know local laws. Ibid.
' Consult generally 5 Finschius, System des katholischen Kirchenrechts mit besonderer
Riicksicht auf Deutschland 921-30 (1895).
6 Regulae luris 13 (1890).
Cicognani, Canon Law 590-97 (2d rev. ed., 1934).
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edge. Therefore no one is bound by any precept unless through the medium
of the knowledge of that precept."38
Under the canon law, knowledge of the law is considered part of the intent
or evil will (dolus).39 Ignorance and error of law, unless culpable, render the
violation involuntary.40
This formulation of the problem of error raises two questions: When is
ignorance culpable? What must the violator know in order to be liable as one
actually aware of the law?
Ignorance of law is non-culpable, because invincible, when a person is unable
to rid himself of it, notwithstanding the employment of moral diligence. 41
Where, on the other hand, knowledge may be acquired, the culpability of
ignorance varies in degree with the effort exerted to dispel it. Thus, ignorance
may be crass or supine 42 when because of heedlessness and laziness practically
no effort is made to secure knowledge, or may be merely vincible when the
effort made is but insufficient.
With regard to the scope of required knowledge, the prevailing principle is
that ignorance merely of the penalty does not excuse from liability.43 Nor is
it required that the actor have actual knowledge of the provision of criminal
law, provided that he knows that the act is prohibited by Divine Law.44 But,
in spite of the general terms of the pertinent Canon,45 the limitation of re-
quired knowledge to knowledge of the prohibition alone does not apply to two
situations: (1) offenses "combined with obstinacy" 46 where, in order to be
' Acquinas, De Veritate q. 17, a. 5. The rules regarding ignorance of law in criminal cases
are contained in Canons 2199, 2202 and 2229, which in language as well as ideas show de-
cisive marks of Roman influence combined with Christian philosophy.
"This conclusion is reached by reading Canon 2199 in conjunction with Canon 2207.
Canon 2199 states: "The imputability of an offense depends on the evil will (dolus) of the
delinquent, or on the extent to which his ignorance of the violated law or his omission of
proper diligence was culpable. Wherefore, all causes which increase, diminish or destroy the
evil will or culpability, automatically increase, diminish or destroy the imputability of the
offense." Canon 2202 provides: "The violation of a law of which one was ignorant is en-
tirely non-imputable, if the ignorance was inculpable; if it was culpable, the liability varies
in proportion of the culpability of the ignorance. Ignorance of the penalty only does not
destroy liability, but it mitigates it somewhat. What is said of ignorance, applies also to
inadvertence and error." Translated in Woywood, A Practical Commentary on the Code
of Canon Law 450-51 (Smith rev., 1952). According to canon-law doctrine: "There can be
no evil will or malice in acting against the law, unless a person knows the law, or is in cul-
pable ignorance of the law, and has the use of his free will to obey or disobey the law."
Ibid., at 450.
40 Cicognani, op. cit. supra note 37, at 595.
Ibid., at 590-91.
""Supine" as used here means stupid or reckless. Consult ibid., at 591. The terms crass
or supine are derived from Digest 22.6.6.
Canon 2202.
"Consult Hinschius, op, cit. supra note 35, at 922.
Canon 2202. "6 Canon 2242, § 1.
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"obstinate" the actor must be aware both of the criminal provision and the
sanction imposed,47 and (2) where the law indicates, by use of appropriate
words (e.g., scienter), that full knowledge of both the prohibition and the
punishment is required. In the latter case, as opposed to the former, crass and
supine ignorance may not substitute for actual knowledge.48
Natural Law
The natural-law belief that the function of law is to operate upon the minds
of men as a causal, motivating, deterrent factor was developed in the writings
of Hobbes, 49 accepted by Puffendorf,50 and led, in Feuerbach's works,51 to
formulation of the "doctrine of psychological compulsion." According to this
doctrine, in order to produce the desired deterrent effect upon the potential
criminal in his process-believed to be perfectly rational-of weighing the
pain of threatened punishment against the pleasure of crime, the law must be
known to him. Such knowledge, indeed, must include acquaintance with the
degree of punishment imposed by the specific criminal statute. Feuerbach met
the difficulties involved in complying with such an unrealistic goal by first in-
troducing a presumption of intent 52 and later replacing it by a "legal presump-
tion of imputability. ' '1 3 He eventually redefined the scope of excusable error.54
The most significant aspect of his theory in the present context, however, is its
foundation upon a doctrine of conscious guilt and its connection with the
principle of nulla poena sine lege. In his view, as there can be no punishment
'z Consult Hinschius, op. cit. supra note 35, at 922-23.
Canon 2229, § 2. The Code speaks only of excuses from penalties latae sententiae, be-
cause in the case of penalties ferendae sententiae which do not take effect against the offender
unless the ecclesiastical judge or superior declares sentence, the law leaves to the discretion
and conscience of the judge or superior the consideration of mitigating circumstances. Woy-
wood, op. cit. supra note 39, at 468.
"* Hobbes, Philosophical Elements of a True Citizen, Philosophical Rudiments Concerning
Government and Society, 2 The English Works of Thomas Hobbes 180 (Molesworth ed.,
1841) ; Hobbes, Leviathan, 3 ibid., at 257 et seq., 279 et seq.
' Puffendorf, De Jure Naturae et Gentium, Libri Octo Lib I, Cap. 6 Sec. 14 (ed. of 1688).
" Feuerbach's contribution was first developed in 2 Revision der Grundsbtze und Grund-
begriffe des positiven peinlichen Rechts 66 (1880), and later expanded and modified in nu-
merous editions of the Lehrbuch des gemeinen in Deutschland geltenden peinlichen Rechts.
I Feuerbach, Lehrbuch des gemeinen in Deutschland geltenden peinlichen Rechts 5 60
(2d ed., 1803).
' Feuerbach, Lehrbuch des gemeinen in Deutschland geltenden peinlichen Rechts § 87
(9th ed., 1825).
r' Feuerbach somewhat modified his absurd assumption that it is "legally certain that
every person endowed with reason is acquainted with criminal statutes," Lehrbuch des ge-
meinen in Deutschland geltenden peinlichen Rechts § 86 (11th ed., 1831), by occasionally
treating "ignorance concerning illegality" and "ignorance concerning dangerousness of the
act" as interchangeable and by introducing the distinctions of admissible and inadmissible
and of vincible and invincible error. Ibid., at § 90.
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without a criminal statute, so there can be no crime without conscious viola-
tion of that statute, essentially consciousness of guilt.
Common Law
The common-law doctrine concerning error of law is generally accepted to
be of Roman origin. But the formulation of the law of error by Sir Matthew
Hale, in his Pleas of the Crown, published in 1680, shows clear marks of the
influence that canonist doctrine had exercised upon the common law. It is
there said that error of law affords no excuse, since everyone is bound and
presumed to know the law, but that ignorance of fact excuses "for such an
ignorance many times makes the act itself morally involuntary."55 On the
other hand, as stated in Blackstone's Commentaries, the rule may be inter-
preted to admit of exceptions: "A mistake in point of law, which every person
of discretion not only may, but is bound and presumed to know, is in criminal
cases, no sort of defence."5 6 This may very well be read as excluding the de-
fense merely in such cases where the law is so well settled and clear that
"(every person of discretion may, and is, therefore, bound and presumed to
know."'57 That belief in the essence of law violation being disobedience to
known law still influenced legal thought in 1843 in England is evidenced by
the ruling in M'Naghten's Case,58 which apparently held error, whether of law
or of fact, to be the ground exempting insane persons from punishment. Such
persons, the case suggests, do not deserve punishment because they are in-
capable of acquiring knowledge of the nature of the act or of its wrongful-
ness.59 In quite recent decisions we still encounter statements such as:
At common law knowledge of the criminality of an act and evil intent in committing
it were essential elements of all crimes, and without a showing thereof directly or by
facts creating a necessary inference of their existence no conviction could be had. 60
Throughout history, as we have seen, pervading all law which institutional-
izes or incorporates morality, is the profound conviction that crime consists in
disobedience to known law, obedience to the law being conceived of as "itself
a moral duty." 61
r' 1 Hale, Pleas of the Crown 42 (1847).
"4 Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 19 (1854).
"Keedy, op. cit. supra note 1, at 78-81, cites cases in which a mistake of law was either
excused or pardoned.
"10 CI. & Fin. 200 (1843).
"The meaning of law to which the error relates is, of course, hopelessly confused. Consult
People v. Schmidt, 216 N.Y. 324, 335, 110 N.E. 945, 948 (1915).
"State v. Dombroski, 145 Minn. 278, 279, 176 N.W. 985, 985 (1920).
Cardozo, J., in People v. Schmidt, 216 N.Y. 324, 340, 110 N.E. 945, 949 (1915).
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Reasons for Maintaining the Maxim
While the maxim error juris non excusat is historically traceable to a canon-
ist misconception of Roman sources, its persistence in modern law is not
explainable solely on historical grounds. The reasons for preserving the maxim
are manifold, and they may differ in various legal systems.
Common to all modern systems which preserve the maxim is a procedural
consideration. This is best demonstrated by the fact that the maxim has been
turned into a procedural presumption, at first a rebuttable presumption and
later a conclusive presumption-in effect, a substantive rule. This presump-
tion is not directly related to any particular difficulties of proving knowledge
of law, as distinct from any other knowledge.62 Rather it is the result of a
general aim of facilitating the burden of proof by limiting its scope. As demon-
strated by historical experience, increasing stress on proof by the prosecution
is usually counterbalanced by a tendency to narrow the scope of that which
must be proved. The rise of the presumption of legal knowledge in the history
of continental Europe thus was closely connected with the shift of the entire
burden of proof to the prosecution in the inquisitorial process. 63 Similarly, in
Anglo-American law the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt con-
tributed to the preservation of the presumption.
The growth of absolute state power and the rise of the notion of sovereign-
ty also favored development and persistence of the presumption, for it endows
the state with a monopoly of law creation and thus supports the state's sov-
ereignty over the individual. In German theory this relation of the doctrine of
error of law to political ideology found an interesting expression in the view
that the individual need not know the law for the law is not addressed to him
at all, but rather is directed to law enforcement agencies.64 The function of
criminal legislation was said to lie not in giving the individual advance notice
of prohibitions so that he might avoid their violation, but rather in limiting
the power of certain branches of government against arbitrary exercise of
authority. In this view, the principle of nulla poena sine lege is oriented to
protection of the individual, not to his information. Thus conceived, the prin-
ciple is not inconsistent with the presumption of legal knowledge. There is,
therefore, no anomaly in the fact that in the nineteenth century, under the
For a contrasting position consult 1 Austin, Lectures on Jurisprudence 482-83 (5th ed.,
Campbell, 1911).
,' The same phenomenon may be observed in the development of theories of natural law.
Feuerbach, in attempting to maintain a stringent requirement of legal knowledge, was even-
tuauy forced to accept a presumption of such knowledge. Consult discussion at 429 supra.
On the other hand, Hobbes, whose requirement of legal knowledge was rather moderate,
rejected conclusive presumptions generally, observing that judges who refuse to hear proof
"refuse to do justice." 3 Hobbes, Leviathan, op. cit. supra note 49, at 266.
"This view was particularly evident in the Constitutio Criminalis Carolina enacted by
the German Reichstag in 1532. Consult 1 Binding, op. cit. supra note 23, at 91.
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rule of the benevolent national state on the European continent, that pre-
sumption developed into a substantive rule.
The same presumption, when enunciated in the twentieth century in the
United States, is inconsistent with the prevailing political doctrine. This in-
consistency is strongly felt in Horning v. District of Columbia,65 in which the
conclusive presumption of legal knowledge is paradoxically combined with an
implied denial that the law-even constitutional law-is the Magna Carta of
the Criminal.66
In countries where the sovereignty of the state took the form of sovereignty
of law, attributes developed with regard to the former have often been trans-
ferred uncritically to the latter. Such transfer may be observed in the theory,
expressed both in the United States67 and France,68 that legal error affords no
defense because the law must be paramount.6 9 But this is hardly the true
ground on which the maxim is being maintained. In the United States, next
to the fact that the presumption operates as a means of narrowing the scope
of proof, the foremost realistic ground seems to be distrust of the legal profes-
sion. If error of law were admitted as a defense, defendants would try to show
that lawyers gave them erroneous advice.
Reasons for holding legal error irrelevant have been expressed at times in
- 254 U.S. 135 (1920). Defendant was charged with doing business as a pawnbroker and
charging more than 6 per cent interest, without a license, in violation of an Act of Con-
gress. Anticipating enactment of that law, he had removed his headquarters to a place in
Virginia, but continued to keep a storehouse in Washington, D.C., and to manage his busi-
ness there. His conviction was affirmed by the Supreme Court, Justice Holmes writing the
majority opinion. Denying relevancy of defendant's contention that he had believed his
conduct to be lawful, justice Holmes said: "There is no question that the defendant inten-
tionally maintained his storehouse and managed his business in the way described. It may
be assumed that he intended not to break the law but only to get as near to the line as he
could, which he had a right to do, but if the conduct described crossed the line, the fact
that he desired to keep within it will not help him. It means only that he misconceived the
law." Ibid., at 137.
'In the same case, over Justice Brandeis' vigorous dissent (ibid., at 140), Justice Holmes
commented upon the trial judge's charge, "Of course, gentlemen of the jury, I cannot tell
you, in so many words, to find defendant guilty, but what I say amounts to that" (ibid., at
140), as follows: "Perhaps there was a regrettable peremptoriness of tone-but the jury
were alowed the technical right, if it can be called so, to decide against the law and the
facts--and that is all there was left for them after the defendant and his witnesses took the
stand. If the defendant suffered any wrong it was purely formal since, as we have said, on
the facts admitted there was no doubt of his guilt." Ibid., at 138-39.
1 "To permit an individual to plead successfully that he had a mistaken opinion of the
law would imply that the meaning of the law is determined not objectively, but by what
an individual understood that law to mean." Hall, General Principles of Criminal Law 353
(1947).
"Application of the law cannot be subordinated to the greater or lesser zeal which those
subject to its jurisdiction may exert in order to acquaint themselves with it." Donnedieu
de Vabres, Trait6 de Droit Criminel et de L6gislation P6nale Compar~e 86 (3d ed., 1947).
"People v. McCalla, 63 Cal. App. 783, 795, 220 Pac. 436, 441 (1923), aff'd 267 U.S. 585
(1924).
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texts of criminal statutes. Thus, Section 3 of the Austrian Penal Code of 1852
originally provided: "No one can excuse himself by ignorance of the present
law concerning felonies, since the wrongfulness of these is unmistakable."7 0
Criticism of the Maxim
Justice Holmes suggested as a remedy for the difficulty of proving knowl-
edge of law that "the burden of proving ignorance" be thrown "on the law-
breaker. ' 71 However, such reversal of the burden of proof can be theoretically
justified only upon the assumption that at least a majority of people know
the law. A reason for rejecting that assumption is expressed in the classic
remark that "everybody is presumed to know the law except His Majesty's
judges, who have a Court of Appeal set over them to put them right."'72 A
distinction in treatment of judicial and private error was not always drawn.
Indeed, it is fair to assume that appellate review developed from trial of
judges accused of adjudicatory error for which, in course of time, they were
permitted to set forth justifying defenses. The principle of judicial independ-
ence, including non-responsibility for error in judgment, is the product of
political evolution. Attack on the prevalent doctrine of private legal error also
should be waged in the area of political ideology, as well as in the area of
jurisprudential doctrine.
The maxim error juris non excusat derives perhaps its strongest support
from two jurisprudential propositions both of which are questionable. The
first proposition, that the law must be paramount to the individual, 73 con-
fuses the subjective value judgment of responsibility, as relating to the partic-
ular defendant, with the objective value judgment of illegality. A person's act
performed in ignorance of law remains illegal. This does not preclude his being
held not responsible for it. The second, Holmesian, proposition, that error of
law cannot be admitted as a defense because it is precisely the policy of the
law "to make men know and obey,"' 74 is contrary to the basic democratic prin-
ciple that man should not be used as a means to an end.75 It also reflects a
"
0 This sentence is now omitted. Consult Das Oesterreichische Strafgesetz (3d ed., Kaniak,
1953). On the previous version, consult Kadecka, Ist das Unrechtsbewusstsein ein allge-
meines Schuldmerkmal? 53 Revue Pnale Suisse 50, 54 (1939). A similar position, that the
wrongfulness of certain crimes is self-evident, has apparently been taken by the Japanese
Supreme Court. That court has occasionally held that, while no one can excuse himself by
ignorance of mala in se, he may have a defense where his ignorance pertains to mala pro-
hibita. Makino: Keihosoron 324-37 (1951). But in general, the court has followed the tra-
ditional maxim. 4 Keizi-Han-Rei-Shu 378 (1925).
' Holmes, The Common Law 48 (1923).
"Williams, Criminal Law, The General Part 386 (1953), attributes this observation to
Judge Maule.
"Consult notes 67, 68 and 69 supra. "Holmes, op. cit. supra note 71.
Consult Kant, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, in 8 Kant, Gesammelte Werke
57 (Rosenkranz ed., 1838).
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mistaken conception of the purpose of criminal law. Justice Holmes' view that
"for the most part, the purpose of the criminal law is only to induce external
conformity to rule,"' 76 of course, applies not alone to criminal law but to all
law. In the area of criminal law, more specifically than in any other law, it is
essential to consider in the light of purpose the type of sanction imposed on
non-conformity. The purpose of criminal law may be different in the case of
crime committed in awareness of the prohibition and in the case of crime
committed without such awareness. Its purpose may be, in the former, to pro-
duce conformity and in the latter to induce care in securing knowledge.
Indeed, the growing group of public welfare offenses, as well as crimes of in-
advertent negligence, can be justified only from the standpoint of the latter
purpose.
Perhaps the most unexpected political attack on the traditional maxim of
legal error comes from Marxist sources. Lenin has described how that maxim
was being used by capitalist bureaucracy as an instrument of exploitation of
the worker who had neither the opportunity nor the means of acquiring
knowledge of the law.7 7 Lenin's interpretation is considered to be a guide to
the Soviet administration of justice.7 8
Both in England and on the European continent critical analysis has been
applied to the assumption, underlying the distinction between error of fact
and error of law, that law and fact are clearly distinguishable.7 9 In Switzer-
land, moreover, attention has been called to the fact that even if law and
fact were thus distinguishable, there would be no justification for treating
error of law differently from error of fact. The latter affords an excuse pre-
cisely because it is believed to preclude consciousness of the illegality of the
act, and this ground applies a fortiori to the former.80
' Holmes, op. cit. supra note 71, at 49.
"'Workers (en masse) usually do not and cannot know the laws, although they are
nevertheless being punished for ignorance of the law by the officials and the official courts.
If the worker, when an official shows him the law, answers that he did not know of that
law, then the official (and the judge) will either laugh or scold him: 'No one has the right
to plead ignorance of the law'--that is what the basic Russian law says. Hence, every offi-
cial and judge assumes that each worker knows the laws. But such assumption is a bour-
geois lie, a lie conceived by property owners and capitalists against the have-nots, a lie
similar to the assumption that the worker concludes with the master a 'free contract.'
In truth, the worker who from early youth goes to the factory, having scarcely learned
how to read and write, has no time, no one from whom, and I dare say, no means whereby,
to learn the law-because when they change the law, the officials of the bourgeoisie do not
ask him. Therefore, the laws will be of little use to the worker." Translated from 4 Lenin,
Ochereknye Zadachy Sovietskoy Vlasti 227-28, cited in Kirichenko, Znachenye Oshybki po-
Sovietskomu Ugolovnomu Pravu, Akademia Nauk USSR, Institut Prava (1952).
" Ibid.
"See West London Commercial Bank v. Kitson, 13 Q.B.D. 360, 363 (1884) ; Eaglesfield
v. Marquis of Londonderry, 4 Ch. D. 693, 703 (C.A., 1876). For a German criticism, con-
sult I Binding, op. cit. supra note 23, at 144 et seq.
Io Consult 1 Thormann and von Overbeck, Das Schweizerische Strafgesetzbuch 107-8
(1940) ; the authors are, however, opposed to assimilation of the two types of error. Con-
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Exceptions to the Maxim
The classical continental and the common-law rules on error of law had a
common root in the Roman law of error as interpreted-probably incorrectly
-by early canon-law doctrine. Hence there is no wonder that both systems
developed the same basic position, best stated in the adage, error of fact ex-
cuses, error of law excuses no one. From this point, however, the history of
the two systems separates. Notwithstanding mutual independence, they have
both evolved by way of judicial legislation rather similar groups of exceptions.
Claim of right.-The principal exception which thus evolved in both legal
systems is that a mistake as to a private right is deemed a mistake of fact
rather than of law. This rule was laid down in a non-criminal case, which has
been subsequently cited in criminal cases,81 before the House of Lords in
which Lord Westbury stated:
It is said, "Ignorantia juris haud excusat"; but in that maxim the word "jus" is used
in the sense of denoting general law,8 2 the ordinary law of the country. But when the
word "jus" is used in the sense of denoting a private right, that maxim has no appli-
cation. Private right of ownership is a matter of fact; it may be the result also of
matter of law.... .3
There are also many criminal cases in England8 4 and in America holding a
claim of private right to be a defense to a criminal indictment.8 5 Greater
weight should be given the view that this rule is of general validity and is not
confined to cases arising under statutes that include a particular pass-word.8 6
Claim of right is not confined to a claim of private right but may be a public
right as well.8 7 Except in cases in which the authorities themselves are re-
sponsible for the accused's error of interpretation, however, the error, to be
excusable, must not relate to the specific provision that had been violated,88
and indeed, must not relate to penal law in general.8 9
sult also Lerch, Tatirrtum und Rechtsirrtum im Schweizerischen Strafrecht, 66 Schweizeri-
sche Zeitschrift ffir Strafrecht 158, 166 (1951).
"' Consult Williams, op. cit. supra note 72, at 896-97.
- In Roman law the reverse was true. Consult discusson at 425 supra.
Cooper v. Phibbs, L.R. 2 H.L. 149, 170 (1867).
Consult Williams, op. cit. supra note 72 passim.
'The American cases are cited and discussed in Hall and Seligman, Mistake of Law and
Mens Rea, 8 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 641 (1941); Perkins, Ignorance and Mistake in Criminal
Law, 88 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 35 (1939); Keedy, op. cit. supra note 1.
I Consult Williams, op. cit. supra note 72, at 421.
'See Regina v. Dodsworth, 8 C.&P. 218, 173 E.R. 467 (1837) (public right to vote);
Lewis v. State, 124 Tex. Crim. App. 582, 64 S.W.2d 972 (1933) (sheriff's claim for fee
from state).
s Perkins, op. cit. supra note 85, at 51.
Ibid., at 52.
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Error of private law.-In Germany, application of the maxim was limited
at an early date by extension of the scope of error of fact. In an 1880 deci-
sion9" the Reichsgericht acquited an accused who, erroneously believing that
the products of real property were not included in an attachment of that
realty, had sold those products. The decision rested on Section 59 of the
Penal Code91 which affords an excuse in the case of "error as to factual cir-
cumstances of the act as defined by statute." The accused's belief in the ex-
clusion of the inventory from the attachment rendered him unaware of the
fact, essential under the statute, that the property sold was attached. His
error thus was excusable even if it arose from ignorance of a legal rule pro-
vided that such rule did not belong to the field of criminal law.
Thus, it appears that in German law, "factual circumstances of the act as
defined by statute" are not necessarily "factual" in kind. As in Anglo-
American law, so in Germany, not all legal error is a so-called error juris. But,
as expressly stated by the Reichsgericht, 92 only an error of non-criminal law
could be thus excused as error of fact, whereas error of criminal law was al-
ways inexcusable.93 We believe, however, that the distinctive treatment of
error of criminal law is based on a misunderstanding of the meaning of error
juris. Jus in this context should mean law in general and not particular law
or laws. 94
Error induced by state.-A number of apparently unrelated exceptions may
be categorized under one heading: error induced by some authoritative act or
omission. In this description might be included improper or inadequate
promulgation or publication, indefiniteness of formulation, erroneous endow-
ment of certain acts with the appearance of jurisdiction, judicial holding that
is later reversed, formally authoritative superior order, as well as advice of
duly admitted members of the Bar. In all such cases, the government, in a
broad sense of the term, does something upon which the accused is entitled to
rely in good faith. In fact in both the continental and the common law, ex-
cuses have been granted under some, though not all, of the enumerated
grounds. The difference in treatment has been due to a diversity of notions
- 1 RGSt. 368 (1880) (Entscheidungen des Reichsgerichts in Strafsachen [Decisions of the
Supreme Court of the Reich, Criminal Matters], henceforth cited as RGSt.).
9' German Penal Code (1871).
" "Only ignorance of the pertinent criminal statute could not be invoked by the accused."
1 RGSt. 368, 370 (1880).
1 Consult Williams, op. cit. supra note 72, at 126 for an application of this classification
to the English cases. Compare Perkins, op. cit. supra note 85, at 51. For a criticism of the
artificiality of the distinction between criminal and civil law, consult Williams, The Defini-
tion of Crime, 8 Current Legal Problems 107-30 (1955).
" Binding states that the Roman error juris "is ignorance of the particular legal norm
which grants the claimant his right, as a source of his ignorance of such individual right-
and such error only." 3 Binding, op. cit. supra note 23, at 43.
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as to what may be taken as authoritative and as to the requirements of good
faith. Some examples follow.
In an English contract case,95 the House of Lords rejected Lord Justice
Denning's lower court ruling that:
Whenever government officers, in their dealings with a subject, take on themselves
to assume authority in a matter with which the subject is concerned, he is entitled to
rely on their having the authority which they assume.90
No American authority has gone as far as Lord Justice Denning suggested.
In People v. Ferguson,97 the court reversed defendant's conviction of issuing
securities without a permit required by the blue sky law, holding erroneous
the rejection of accused's offer of proof that the corporation commissioner, au-
thorized to establish "rules and regulations ... to carry out the purposes...
of this act,"98 had advised him that no permit was necessary for this partic-
ular issue. But in People v. Settles,9" the holding of the Ferguson case was
confined to the situation where the advice regarding legality of the act charged
bad been given by "some officer directly charged with the duty of enforcing
the law"' 00 involved. Thus, reliance on advice given by a government officer
having no general jurisdiction over the matter in issue is not protected.
In contrast, an early German case' 0 ' held defendants' reliance on a license
to transport dynamite, issued by a wrong agency, entitled to protection. The
court based the decision on the ground that defendants' error was their incor-
rect assumption that they were in possession of a proper police permit, the
absence of such permit being an essential part of the statutory facts of the
crime with which they were charged. Thus, their error concerned "factual
circumstances of the act as defined by statute.
°102
Hall and Seligman suggest that "the action of any official who is appointed
to represent the state in its dealings with the public in some particular matter,
should bind the state to give a defense to criminal prosecution"103 but that
"where the advice comes from a public official whose position is not connected
with the subject matter concerning which the advice was given,"' 04 there
should be no defense. They do not deal with the frequent situation where the
'Howell v. Falmouth Boat Construction Ltd., [1951] A.C. 837 (H.L.)
"Falmouth Boat Construction Ltd. v. Howell, [1950] 1 All E.R. 538, 542.
' 134 Cal.App. 41, 24 P.2d 965 (1933).
0 Cal. Stat. (1925) c. 447, 5 4, at 966.
"29 Cal.App.2d 781, 78 P.2d 274 (1938).
"00 Ibid., at 785, 276.
"0112 RGSt. 431 (1885).
1 German Penal Code §59 (1871).
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error concerns jurisdiction of the advising official, a problem which is particu-
larly intricate where jurisdictional limits are tenuous. Nor does their sugges-
tion cover the situation in which the person giving advice does not technically
represent the state but is nevertheless, in a sense, authorized by the state to
give such advice. For example, an attorney would fall within neither of the
categories to which they refer, but he is certainly licensed to give legal advice
to the public. Neither in England nor in the United States, however, is advice
of counsel generally considered a defense. 10 5 In Switzerland, the advice of an
attorney has been held relevant, at least to the extent it bears on the intent to
commit a particular type of crime. 106
A most difficult problem is raised by ambiguity in statutory or other govern-
mental language. The error of law such ambiguity invites is certainly one for
which the state rather than the individual should be held responsible. How-
ever, in the United States, unless the statute is struck down as a violation of
due process, such error can be held excusable only where it is supported by a
judicial decision which is later reversed. 0 7 But in Switzerland, under the fed-
eral law in force until 1942, acquittal of an accused could be secured upon a
mere showing that the pertinent statutory provision, being ambiguous or
vague, had invited error of interpretation. 10 8
Error excluding required state of mind.-The most comprehensive excep-
tion to the maxim is the rule that error of law is a defense if it "negatives the
purpose, knowledge, belief, recklessness or negligence required to establish a
material element of the offense. . ... 109 Although this rule seems to apply
only to error of fact or law other than that under which the accused is
charged, it may be assumed that it covers ignorance of the particular statute
if this intention is indicated by the statute." 0 In these cases the defense is
misconception of the very criminal statute the violation of which is charged,
not any error of fact or other law."'
'o5 Consult Williams, op. cit. supra note 72, at 396; Hall and Seligman, op. cit. supra
note 85, at 652. But see Long v. State, 44 Del. 262, 65 A.2d 489 (1949).
'"Matter of Kilchenmann, [1926] 63 Zeitschrift des Bernischen Juristenvereins 265
(1927).
'lo See United States v. Mancuso, 139 F.2d 90 (C.A. 3d, 1943) ; State v. O'Neil, 147 Iowa
513, 126 N.W. 454 (1910); consult A.L.I. Model Penal Code, Tentative Draft No. 4, com-
ments, at 139 (1955).
" Staatsanwaltschaft des Kantons Zug gegen Husistein, BGE 75 IV 26, 29 (1949) (Ent-
scheidungen des Schweizerischen Bundesgerichts [Decisions of the Swiss Federal Court],
henceforth cited as BGE), and cases there cited. Consult discussion at 441 infra.
1O A.L.I. Model Penal Code, Tentative Draft No. 4, §2.04(1) (a) (1955).
It should be noted, however, that error regarding criminal law is specifically excluded
from the provisions of error even in such progressive legislation as the Wisconsin Criminal
Code (1955). Section 939.43, entitled "Mistake," provides: "(1) An honest error, whether
of fact or of law other than criminal law, is a defense if it negatives the existence of a state
of mind essential to the crime."
'See Ocean Accident and Guarantee Corporation v. Cole, [1932] 2 K.B. 100. Consult
Williams, op. cit. supra note 72, at 411. The Cole case involved a charge of violating a
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In Germany, the Reichsgericht generally held, even in those cases where the
criminal statute used the term "illegally," that consciousness of illegality was
required only with regard to law other than criminal." 2 In some cases, it
specifically held that the term did not imply a requirement of knowledge of
any criminal provision enacted in the public interest." 3 But in Switzerland,
use of the specific term illegal to describe "intent" in Article 11 of the Federal
Criminal Law of 1853, actually introduced error of law as a general defense" 4
in the entire area of federal criminal law." 5 This Swiss doctrine, although
abandoned by the Federal Criminal Code of 1937, constituted a decisive his-
torical phase in the development of error of law as a defense. Indeed, with
this doctrine a new chapter of the history of error juris was opened.116
statute which made it an offense for an insurance company to issue a certificate of insur-
ance that was "false to the knowledge" of the company. The company, on payment of a
premium, issued a retrospective certificate which was held to be false within the meaning
of the statute because it purported to cover a period in which the insured was not in fact
covered. But the defendant company was held not to have knowingly issued a false cer-
tificate since, although it knew that the insurance was not operative during the time pur-
portedly covered, it was not aware of the fact that this made it false within the statute.
1 German Penal Code § 123 (Trespass), 19 RGSt. 298 (1889); German Penal Code § 303
(Damage to Things), 19 RGSt. 209 (1889).
n3 German Penal Code § 246 (Embezzlement), § 350 (Embezzlement in Office), 61 RGSt.
207 (1927).
" Since the general provision of Article 11 was not only applicable to that act itself but
also was usually incorporated by reference in other federal enactments, consciousness of
illegality was consistently held to be part of criminal intent in federal crime.
"' Ritter gegen Statthalteramt ZUrich, BGE 60 1 412 (1934) ; Schmitt gegen Basel-Stadt,
Staatsanwaltschaft, BGE 66 I 107 (1940); Briggmann gegen Aargau, Staatsanwaltschaft,
BGE 62 I 46 (1936).
'e Exceptions to the maxim have also been occasionally made in cases of acts done pur-
suant to an order of a superior, and in cases of statutes expressly adopting the defense
of legal error. The former exception was adopted in Regina v. James, 8 C.&P. 131, 173 E.R.
429 (1837), where Lord Abinger, C.B., laid down the rule that where defendants "acted
bona fide in obedience to the orders of a superior, conceiving that he had the right which
he claimed" (ibid., at 132, 430), they were not guilty of a felony when they obstructed the
airduct of a mine. It should be noted that in this case the right disputed between the defend-
ants' master and the owner of an adjoining colliery was a private right to the passageway,
but that by obstructing the airway of the mine, they may have jeopardized the life of
workers. However, in English law, the mistaken belief of an accused that it was his duty
to obey the order of a superior usually affords no excuse even where the order is that of a
military superior. Consult authorities cited and discussed in Williams, op. cit. supra note 72,
at 391-93. In France, some authorities believe that a soldier owes his superior only "reason-
able" obedience, whereas others favor a "passive" obedience. Consult Garraud and Laborde-
Lacoste, Expos6 M6thodique de Droit Pnal 76 (4th ed., 1942). Garraud suggests as a com-
mon sense rule that the soldier has a right to disobey an order where its illegality is obvious,
and that he be accorded, in any event, the privilege of relying on the excuse of coercion or
even of the lack of intention.
Error of law is a defense for children and the insane in all criminal law systems. More-
over, the defense is granted in certain special situations. For example, in France a specific
provision allows a plea of ignorance where the offense was committed within three days of
promulgation of the substantive prohibition. Ibid., at 117. In Germany, the defense of error
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II. CONTEMPORARY PROBLEm OF ERROR JURIS AS A DEFENSE
Error of law as a general defense to a charge of crime may be based either
on a psychological or a normative theory of guilt. The former view is often
called the "theory of intent," the latter the "theory of guilt." While both
theories oppose the maxim error juris non excusat, it is the former which has
led the struggle for its repeal. For this reason, and because it is the more
conventional, it will be discussed first.
The Psychological Theory of Guilt
Throughout history, until amendment of the Swiss federal law in 1937,
wherever error of law has been admitted as a general defense, it has been so
admitted on a theory of intent. This was the doctrine underlying the law of
the Bible and the Talmud, the Roman, Roman-German and canon law. Dolus
malus, Zemama, bitser Wille, wicked mind and mens rea all convey the idea of
intent directed to law violation or wrong doing, implying knowledge that what
is being done is wrong. To have an evil intent, a man must know the "nature
and quality of the act," and originally this probably included knowledge that
the act was "wrong," for nature and morality were not separated." 7 Lack of
such knowledge negatived intent with the result that the actor could not be
punished for intentional (as opposed to negligent) crime, even though he
purposefully brought about the illegal result.
According to the conventional psychological theory, guilt is either intent
or negligence, depending upon whether the crime is one of intent or one of
negligence. Intent requires consciousness of illegality; such consciousness is a
natural part of intent. Indeed, some authors simply define intent as con-
sciousness of wrongdoing." 8 It has even been contended that negligence re-
quires possibility of knowledge of illegality." 9 In any event, in intentional
crime, consciousness of illegality is essential to intent, and the latter consti-
tutes guilt. Punishment of an act committed without such consciousness is
punishment "for the consequences of the act" without guilt and thus is a
of law was first introduced in certain special statutes; this legislation constituted a pre-
liminary step leading to adoption of error of law as a general defense. Consult Dalcke,
Strafrecht und Strafverfahren, Comment to Section 59, Penal Code, at 60 (36th ed., 1955).
'x It is rather likely that the M'Naghten rules-which stress the element of error as to
the wrongfulness of the act-were derived from what at an earlier stage was but one test.
It may well be that lack of knowledge as to the wrong was not a defense reserved for the
insane, but merely was easier to prove in their case.
u18 Consult Fitting, Intention Dolosive et Erreur de Droit, 101 Journal des Tribunaux IV 2
(1953), where it is said that in Swiss law prior to the Penal Code of 1937 "simple or general
dolus [was] summarily defined as consciousness of acting wrongfully (la conscience de Mal
agir) ."
' Consult Kirichenko, op. cit. supra note 77, at 27, with regard to Soviet law.
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violation of the principle nulla poena sine culpa (no punishment without
guilt) 120
Swiss law of 1853.--The doctrine of intent has been best represented in
modern legislation by Article 11 of the Swiss Federal Criminal Law of 1853.121
In this article, intent was described as illegal intent. The Swiss Federal
Tribunal held illegal to mean in consciousness of illegality, so that it was
not necessary for the Tribunal to decide whether in the absence of that term
such consciousness would have been required. 12 2 However that may be, under
Article 11, the Federal Tribunal1 23 as well as other courts 24 consistently
held consciousness of illegality to be essential to intentional guilt. This
position was vigorously opposed by traditional law, which did not regard
error of law as a defense. Agitation favoring the traditional view finally
resulted in the compromise solution adopted in the Penal Code of 1937.
United States law.-In the United States, as in England, it is a truism that
an error of law affords no defense. However, the Supreme Court of Delaware
has suggested that "a mistake of law, where not a defense, may nevertheless
negative a general criminal intent as effectively as would an exculpatory
mistake of fact.' 25 The court thought this position inferable from the admis-
sibility of the defense of mistake of law where it negatives a specific intent.
Polish law.-The Polish Penal Code of July 11, 1932, provides that "a
justified unconsciousness of illegality may be considered by the court as a
ground for extraordinary mitigation of punishment."'12 6 The Supreme Court
of Poland has interpreted this provision to exclude error of law, whether civil
or criminal, as a "defense.' 12 7 But since the Code states that "an intentional
'°M. E. Mayer, Der allgemeine Teil des Deutschen Strafrechts 316 (1923), states: "The
doctrine of error is... not but a consequence to be derived from the doctrine of guilt; it is
the doctrine of guilt itself...."
'm III Amtliche Sammung der Bundesgesetze und Verordnungen der schweizerischen Eid-
genossenschaft 404 (1853).
'Ritter gegen Statthalteramt Zilrich, BGE 60 I 412 (1934). The tribunal said that "the
very wording of. .. [Article 11] indicates that only a person who consciously (meaning,
with consciousness of illegality) violates the law is subject to punishment." Ibid., at 418.
I Consult cases cited in note 115 supra.
E.g., Matter of Fliihmann, 63 Zeitschrift des Bernischen Juristenvereins 266 (App. Ct.
Bern, 1926) (error induced by misleading proclamation).
'-Long v. State, 44 Del. 262, 278, 65 A.2d 489, 497 (1949). The error was one of "sub-
sumption" of a factual situation under an abstract law, known to the accused. The opinion
is perhaps the most convincing argument in favor of admitting error of law as a defense
in this country. It shows that the distinction drawn between error of fact and error of law
is particularly dubious under the prevailing jurisprudential view that "law" is prediction
of what courts will do in the future. In this view, rules of law are not in essence distinguish-
able from laws of nature. Error as to the latter is traditionally considered an excusable error
of fact.
" Polish Penal Code (July 11, 1932) Art. 20, § 2.
'z Decision of April 21, 1934, Nr. 102/34, cited in 8liwifiski, Prawo Karne 241 n. 2 (1946).
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criminal act" is present where the actor "wants to commit it" or where "he
foresees the possibility of a criminal consequence or of the criminal character
of his act and consents to it,"'1 2 authoritative legal writers have concluded
that awareness of illegality is an essential part of intent.12 9
Soviet law.-While the test of illegality in Soviet law is believed to be of
Italian origin, the Soviet theory of error of law is derived largely from Ger-
man jurisprudence, particularly the German-Swiss conception of a criminal
law based on guilt, as distinguished from criminal law based on consequences
of the act. 3 0 The RSFSR Penal Code13 provides that improvement measures
of social defense may be applied to intentional acts where the actor has fore-
seen the social dangerousness of the consequences of his act. In legal litera-
ture, Isajev, Herzenson and Kirichenko, among others, believe that conscious-
ness of illegality, in the sense of social dangerousness, is essential to constitute
intent.' 32
Normative Theory of Guilt
According to conventional doctrine, as has been seen, guilt is the actor's
psychological state of mind with regard to the act, that is, either in intent or
in negligence. No evaluation of such state of mind, beyond that implicit in
the distinctive treatment of intent and negligence, is believed necessary. But
beginning with Rheinhard Frank, German writers have questioned the suffi-
ciency of that psychological test as a test of guilt. In Frank's view, guilt
presupposes, in addition to the psychological element of intent or negligence,
a normative element, namely, "blameworthiness" of the conduct. He states:
Of two acts, both committed with equal intent and directed at the same interest,
one may be more guilty and more severely punishable than the other, because it was
committed with greater freedom (of will). Therefore, the concept of guilt must be
so formulated as to admit degrees. 133
'Polish Penal Code (July 11, 1932) Art. 14, § 1.
' Makarewicz, Bled co do przestgpnogci dzialania 1 Ruch prawniczy, ekonomiczny I
socjologiczny 33 (1936).
'Kirichenko, op. cit. supra note 77, at 18, states that "[t]his follows from the truly
democratic character of Soviet law which does not recognize crimes qualified by conse-
quences beyond the limits of guilt."
" Criminal Code of the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic (Nov. 22, 1926)
Art. 10 (Laws No. 80, p. 600). There are corresponding provisions in the laws of other
Soviet Republics.
... Consult Kirichenko, op. cit. supra note 77, at 20-34, for a comprehensive discussion of
Soviet decisions and legal literature. In contrast to the sweeping assertions of some Soviet
writers, the Soviet decisions admitting error of law as a defense are rather moderate. Most
of them involve laws the knowledge of which was not accessible to the accused.
' Frank, Das Strafgesetzbuch fUr das Deutsche Reich 137 (18th rev. ed., 1929-30). Frank
first introduced the normative theory of guilt in 1907 (tber den Aufbau des Schuldbe-
griffes). Freedom, according to Frank, may be affected by either absence of knowledge or
of the possiblity of knowledge or by circumstances, such as external pressure (coercion,
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As viewed by the school of thought initiated by Frank, guilt is the blame
attaching to an act, which varies in degree depending on the actor's freedom,
under the circumstances of the case, to forego action. Since a person who
enjoys greater freedom can be more readily expected to forego committing the
crime, his crime deserves higher moral censure. Later writers have completely
"de-psychologized" guilt and identified it with mere blameworthiness. 3 4
Views on error of law diverge as protagonists adhere either to the psycho-
logical or normative theory of guilt. Some authors hold knowledge of illegality
to be part of intent (psychological guilt), while others believe that knowledge
to be essential to blameworthiness (normative guilt). The conception of intent
under the former view, since it includes knowledge of illegality, is quite dif-
ferent from that of the common law. Intent under the latter view, however, is
to the extent that it does not require such knowledge, similar to intent under
the common law. Under the normative theory, knowledge of illegality be-
comes relevant as part of the freedom with which a person acts in any partic-
ular case, freedom being essential to blameworthiness of the act.
The practical implications of adhering to either of these two theories are
very far-reaching. If knowledge of illegality is part of "intent," it is for the
prosecution to prove it; in the absence of such knowledge there can be no
conviction of intentional crime. No distinction can be drawn between complete
lack of knowledge and mistaken knowledge. Nor is there any difference, so
far as intentional crime is concerned, between the situation where the error
itself is due to the accused's own fault or negligence and the situation where
such error is wholly imputable to the state. In the former situation, the
accused can be convicted at best of negligent crime, assuming that such crime
is punishable under the statute. Thus, the rule implicit in this theory is paral-
lel to that applicable to error of fact. If, on the other hand, knowledge of
illegality is a requirement of guilt in a normative sense, there may be a
broader discretion in judging crime committed in error of law. For such guilt
admits of degrees according to the extent of the actor's blameworthiness. Of
course, if his error is not due to any fault on his part, he must be acquitted.
But if he is himself at fault in not having acquired the necessary knowledge,
he should be convicted according to the degree of such fault. The degree of
his fault or blameworthiness is determined by the judge in the exercise of his
reasonable discretion. In the event of such fault, since an error of law does
not necessarily exclude intent, the actor may be convicted not merely of
necessity) or mental defects (including incapacity), which deprive the actor of his freedom
of choice and thus of control over his actions. Frank's theory afforded the basis, for ex-
ample, for the view that a person who commits a proscribed act in a state of necessity, acts
illegally but is exempt from the "blame of guilt," because he enjoys no freedom. Consult
Maurach, Deutsches Strafrecht, allgemeiner Tell 315-16 (1954).
"l Consult discussion at 448-49 infra.
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negligent but indeed of "intentional" crime. Additionally, crime committed
because of ignorance may be distinguished from that caused by mistake.
Theoretically, within this view, there is no objection to reversing the burden
of proof.
The normative theory as the result of compromise (Swiss Penal Code of
1937).--Switzerland, in her Penal Code of 1937, was first to give legal ex-
pression to the new normative theory. This development did not result from
dogmatic adherence to that theory but rather from a practical compromise
between the traditional view, which rejected error of law as a defense, and
the psychological theory expressed in Article 11 of the Federal Criminal Law
of 1853.135 It will be remembered that Article 11 stated that the acts and
omissions proscribed by the Code should be punishable only if committed
"with illegal intent." Since "with illegal intent" was understood to mean
"with knowledge of illegality," no separate provision on error of law was
deemed necessary. The Code of 1937 omits the adjective "illegal" in describ-
ing "intent." To be punishable, an act now need be committed only intention-
ally, meaning with knowledge and will.1 3 6 This has been interpreted to mean
that consciousness that the act is illegal or contrary to duty is no longer part
of intent.137 Abandonment of the 1853 version conformed to demands of those
who adhered to the maxim error juris non excusat, which was deeply imbedded
in Swiss cantonal tradition.'
38
However, this traditional view, allegedly supported by popular opinion, 139
"' Consult note 121 supra.
. Swiss Penal Code (1937) Art. 18.
"'It is said in the leading case of Gbirner gegen Statthalteramt Luzern-Stadt, BGE 70 IV
97, 99-100 (1944), that "the appellant is not punishable unless he committed the violation
intentionally (Arts. 102, 18, Penal Code). A person acts intentionally, if he commits the act
with knowledge and will (Art. 18, § 2, Penal Code). As may be seen from the very wording
of this provision, which-in contrast to Article 11, Federal Criminal Law-does not speak
of an illegal intent, consciousness that the act is illegal or contrary to duty is not a part of
intent."
'Error juris non excusat was expressly proclaimed in older cantonal statutes. Consult
Hafter, Lehrbuch des Schweizerischen Strafrechts, allgemeiner Tell 187 (2d rev. ed., 1946).
The view adopted by the 1853 Code was also opposed by writers who assumed intent to be
"ethically and legally colorless." Stoos, Vorsatz und Bewusststein der Rechtswidrigkeit, 12
Schweizerische Zeitschrift fUr Strafrecht (1899). Stoos, however, later apparently aban-
doned this view in favor of the idea that there is no need to stress consciousness of illegality
since it is implied in every criminal act. In his words, "every criminal, who is not mentally
ill, feels, to a larger or smaller extent, the immorality of his act, and it is hence unnecessary
to stress this ethical side of intent .... " Quoted in Fitting, op. cit. supra note 118, at 5.
" In the Second Commission of Experts, Planta observed that popular opinion would
oppose granting immunity in certain cases. Examples of such cases are those in which an
Italian homosexual believed that sodomy with a minor is not illegal in Switzerland (example
used by Thormann), or that of a car driver from another canton who, due to ignorance,
violated the traffic laws of Graublinden. Legislative history is to be found in Girner gegen
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was vigorously opposed by the weight of juristic authority, which in Switzer-
land adhered to the German doctrine of intent. Concessions were made slowly.
In the first drafts of the new Code, which were greatly influenced by the tra-
ditional view, judges were given only discretionary power to mitigate punish-
ment.1 40 Later they were given the power to forego punishment entirely, in
cases where the actor believed that he had a right to act as he did. The version
which finally became law (Article 20), while granting that concession, is
otherwise more limited than the original drafts. Article 20 provides that:
"Where the actor assumed, on adequate grounds, that he had a right to act,
the judge may, in his discretion, mitigate or entirely forego punishment."
While the scope of this article is extremely narrow, it is not restricted to cases
involving a claim of right based on belief that the situation qualifies within
one of the justification grounds enumerated in other articles of the Code.1 4 1
It has been suggested 1 42 that Article 20 is available only where the accused
had an erroneous conception of law, for it applies only where he believed he
had a right to act as he did. Thus the defense does not seem to be available
where the actor had no conception of the law at all, as where it never occurred
to him that his conduct might be prohibited. The Federal Tribunal has re-
peatedly emphasized that mistake of law no longer automatically leads to
acquittal but merely affords a basis for exercise of judicial discretion to miti-
gate or forego punishment.
143
Nor does Article 20 afford a broad discretion for mitigating or foregoing
punishment in the event of error. To be entitled to consideration at all, the
error must be based on adequate grounds. Thus, the previous rule that error
of law was a defense to a charge of intentional crime, whether or not the
accused's error was the result of his own fault, is replaced by the rule that
negligent error does not entitle the accused to the benefit of Article 20. This
qualification is illustrated by a case in which the defendant was charged with
Statthalteramt Luzern-Stadt, BGE 70 IV 97, 99-100 (1944) ; Lerch, Tatirrtum und Rechts-
irrtum im Schweizerischen Strafrecht, 66 Schweizerische Zeitschrift fiir Strafrecht 158, 172-
74 (1951).
"o Preliminary Draft of 1908. Consult Gbrner gegen Statthalteramt Luzern-Stadt, BGE
70 IV 97 (1944). In 1918 the Draft still provided only that "[tihe punishment of a person
who commits a crime in the belief that he has a right to act may be mitigated." Consult
Lerch, op. cit. supra note 139, at 173-74.
"' Germann, Das Verbrechen in neuen Strafrecht 185 et seq. (1942), takes an opposite
view. In Grner gegen Statthalteramt Luzern-Stadt, BGE 70 IV 97, 98-99 (1944), the court
rejects Germann's position, pointing out that the Italian ("che l'atto fosse lecito") and
French ("de se croire en droit d'agir") versions do not support the restrictive interpretation.
"'Consult Lerch, op. cit. supra note 139, at 174, 175.
'G6rner gegen Statthalteramt Luzern-Stadt, BGE 70 IV 97 (1944) ; Staatsanwaltschaft
des Kantons Zug gegen Husistein, BGE 75 IV 26 (1949) ; Eidgenissisches Volkswirtschafts-
departement gegen Schluep, BGE 75 IV 37 (1949); Procureur g6n6ral du Canton de
Neuchatel contre Strautmann, BGE 69 IV 178 (1943).
19571
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
carnal knowledge of a girl under the age of sixteen.-4 4 Defendant contended
that while he knew that the girl was under sixteen and was instinctively aware
of the prohibition against sexual intercourse with children, he assumed, the
girl appearing to be mature, that the prohibition did not apply. The Federal
Tribunal, reversing the judgment below, stated that Article 20 was not
applicable because the error was not based on "adequate grounds." It said
that "[a] ground is adequate where the actor cannot be blamed for his legal
error, because that error is based on circumstances which would have misled
a conscientious man."'1 4 5
The Federal Tribunal has only rarely found the error of law not a result
of the accused's fault. It did so find in the rather obvious situation where the
accused had been misled by the terms of a license where the applicable law
was so difficult of deduction that even competent authorities disagreed as to
the proper interpretation.1 46 But even where the traffic law and regulation vio-
lated by the accused were not generally known, the court held that he was
at fault for he should have known that driving as he did was dangerous. 147
Indeed, in one case 148 the accused's error was held not to be based on "ade-
quate grounds" although it was shared by the prosecutor. In another case,
error149 was held inexcusable although shared by the court below. A further
limitation results from the fact that "adequacy of grounds" is related to the
scope of knowledge required for conviction which, as will be more fully shown
later, is extremely narrow. 5°
Judicial discretion in applying Article 20 has been further limited by a
'" Staatsanwaltschaft des Kantons Basel-Land gegen L., BGE 75 IV 150 (1949).
" Thus an objective standard was adopted. The court, in holding the belief not based on
adequate grounds, suggested that the defendant "knowing of a potential prohibition of sex
intercourse with school girls .. should have, in conversations with other persons, inquired
whether sex intercourse with physically mature but still youthful female persons is subject
to punishment." Ibid., at 153.
"' Staatsanwaltschaft des Kantons Zirich gegen Werdenberg, BGE 68 IV 21 (1942). The
court added: "That the accused desired to have the decisive legal question determined by
the judge and therefore did not submit to the fine, does not carry the inference that he
had a consciousness of illegality." Ibid., at 30.
... Baumann gegen Staatsanwaltschaft des Kantons Aargau, BGE 75 IV 131 (1949).
' MUIler gegen General-prokurator des Kantons Bern, BGE 75 IV 33 (1949).
... Gesundheitsbehirde Meilen gegen Ellenberger, BGE 75 IV 76 (1949).
"Thus, Weyeneth und Fliickiger gegen Staatsanwaltschaft des Kantons Basel-Stadt,
BGE 80 IV 15 (1954), affirmed defendant's conviction of usury by exploiting the corpo-
rate victim's state of necessity. The Federal Tribunal there stated that it was not necessary,
as assumed by the court below, that the defendants recognize the relationship of the mutual
obligations of the parties as "obviously disproportionate for the simple reason that appel-
lants could not rely on any adequate ground that might have retracted from the feeling
that such unscrupulous exploitation of the state of necessity of a corporation violates at
least in some way that which is right." Ibid., at 21. Cf. Statthalteramt Zrich gegen Hodel,
BGE 81 IV 191 (1955).
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holding that "adequacy of grounds" is not a pure matter of fact on which the
trial judge can pass with finality. In the carnal knowledge case mentioned
previously 15 ' the Federal Tribunal held the question of the defendant's
knowledge to be an unreviewable question of fact. At the same time, it held
the question of whether the accused's error in knowledge was based on ade-
quate grounds within the meaning of Article 20 to be a reviewable question
of law.15 2
The compromise solution of Article 20 has been severely criticized by
Swiss writers, most of whom adhere to the view that consciousness of illegality
is a natural part of intent and that departure from this position constitutes
abandonment of "criminal law based on guilt" in favor of "criminal law
based on consequences of the act.' 53 The Federal Tribunal itself indicated
preference for the doctrine of intent by suggesting 54 that the alternative of
granting inmunity to the accused who acted in ignorance of the legal pro-
hibition is preferable to a mere reduction of punishment, for it accords with
the principle, "no punishment without guilt," incorporated in other provisions
of the Code. On the other hand, the pressure of the old tradition of error juris
nocet has inhibited judges in the use of their power to forego or even to
mitigate punishment, 155 as is evidenced by the numerous cases in which
Article 20 has been held inapplicable. 156
The present rule is also being criticized on the ground that there is no
logical basis for distinguishing between error of law and error of fact, the
latter being relevant only because it excludes consciousness of the illegality
of the act.15 7 The realization is growing that the sole reason for excluding or
' Discussed in text at note 144 supra.
'This decision is consistent with Ritter gegen Statthalteramt ZUrich, BGE 60 I 412
(1934), which was decided under the 1853 Code.
' Consult Hafter, op. cit. supra note 138, at 125 ("The judge should be allowed to con-
vict of intentional commission of a crime only where this consciousness of illegality [vio-
lation of duty] is present.") ; Germann, op. cit. supra note 141, at 186 ("[C]onsciousness
of illegality is the very first requisite of the dolus malus.") ; Schwander, Das Schweizerische
Strafgesetzbuch 84 (1952) ("The rule of Article 20 is inconsistent with the principle of
guilt.").
' In Gibrner gegen Statthalteramt Luzern-Stadt, BGE 70 IV 97 (1944), the court said
that "it must be taken into consideration that ... [acquittal] accords with the principle
'No punishment without guilt,' dominant in the Penal Code, and that, therefore, it merits,
as a rule, preference over [mere mitigation] ......
Hafter, op. cit. supra note 138, at 189.
Consult cases cited in notes 144, 147-49 supra.
' The rapporteur, Seiler, in discussing error of fact in the House of Representatives,
stated: "Theoretically, the person acting in error concerning the factual situation does not
act 'knowingly.' Error of fact excludes consciousness of illegality and thus excludes intent."
Quoted by Lerch, op. cit. supra note 139, at 166. Thormann and von Overbeck, 1 Das
Schweizerische Strafgesetzbuch 107-8 (1940), state that "in the last analysis, every relevant
error, even the purest 'error of fact,' results in the erroneous assumption that the actor is
permitted to act as he does...."
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limiting the defense of error of law lies in the alleged difficulty of proof. 158
That this assumption is unwarranted in the light of the scope of knowledge
of law required under Swiss law can be better shown after a later discussion
of that problem.159'
Rationalized approach to the normative theory (German development).-
In Germany, in contrast to Switzerland, struggles over the rule on error of
law appear on a doctrinal level, being waged primarily between adherents of
the theory of intent and those of the theory of guilt. This controversy is high-
lighted by the dramatic dispute between Mezger, representing a modified
doctrine of intent, and Welzel, introducing a novel, extreme theory of guilt.
The dispute is strongly colored by opposing theoretical views concerning the
tenuous dividing lines between the three traditionally accepted elements of
crime: (1) Accordance of the facts of a crime charged with the facts as
defined by statute (denoted as Tatbestand, referred to hereafter, colloquially,
as actus reus'60); (2) Illegality, meaning absence of justifying grounds that
exclude criminality of conduct notwithstanding the fact that such conduct
may otherwise constitute an actus reus 61 ; and (3) Guilt or responsibility.
As has been seen, Frank has defined guilt as comprising, besides intent or
negligence, the normative element of blameworthiness. But Welzel has over-
hauled the entire tripartite division, assigning to each of the three elements
functions that deviate considerably from those traditionally assigned. From
a doctrinal point of view, his principal innovation pertains to the demarcation
line between actus reus and guilt. His conception of the proper dividing line
between actus reus and illegality bears on incidental problems such as the
proper place and treatment of error regarding justification grounds.
According to Welzel, intent and negligence are not part of guilt at all, but
rather belong to the actus reus. His theory proceeds from a critique of the
established concept of the actus reus and a revolutionary notion of "action"
as the basis of the theory of crime. He claims that the traditional theory of
the actus reus, as separate from the mental attitude of the actor toward
external facts, is a product of the mechanistic philosophy of past ages which
assumed that the content of will is merely the actor's subjective image of
external events. That traditional doctrine, which Welzel calls the "causal
action doctrine," is, in his opinion, traceable to the naturalistic view classically
presented in Franz Liszt's well-known statement that a defamation is but
excitement of air movements and nerve stimuli.1 62 Against the background
Consult Thormann and von Overbeck, op. cit. supra note 157, at 107.
Consult discussion at 459 infra.
1"The term actus reus is used here to include both the act and all the circumstances of
the act, as described in a statute.
.The meaning and scope of illegality, as well as that of the actus reus and guilt, are con-
troversial.
" Cited by Welzel, Das neue Bid des Strafrechtssystems 12, 13 (1952).
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of this critique, directed particularly at Mezger, Welzel presents his theory.
Under this theory, which he calls the "teleological action doctrine," every
action is directed toward a goal. The aim, an essential part of the act, is
included in the actus reus. Intent that sets the aim is thus a constituent
element of the actus reus and not a part of guilt.03 Guilt is but the blame-
worthiness of the act. Welzel thus abandons all vestiges of the psychological
theory of guilt.
A philosophical consideration underlies Welzel's approach to the problem
of separating actus reus from guilt and illegality, 164 and thus from intent
and consciousness of illegality. According to him, the conventional doctrine
which views intent as separate from the actus reus is based on the so-called
"ethics of attitude," as distinguished from "ethics of responsibility." The
former demands merely man's subjective purity of intention, regardless of
the objective characteristics of his act. So long as his intention is pure he can-
not be held responsible, however reprehensible or outrageous his action may
be. The latter demands, in addition to purity of intention
consciousness of the duty to ascertain the true obligation, the struggle for the right
decision. Purity of attitude, acting in accordance with the consciousness of duty is
but one side of the ethical value of an act; the other, primary, side is responsibility
for the substantively correct decision within the framework of individual ethical
capacity of realization. Concern with the correct decision is the element that endows
the subjectively moral act with full earnestness and existential weight. It imposes
upon the person responsibility not only for the purity of his attitude but also for the
ethical correctness of his act.'0 5
These words are extremely significant, for they summarize the philosophic
point of departure from which the Bundesgerichtshof'OO proceeded in adopting
the normative theory. Guilt, as will be seen, is assumed not only where the
' Welzel, Das Deutsche Strafrecht 28-36 (5th ed., 1954). Welzel originally faced con-
siderable difficulty in attempting to integrate negligent acts into his doctrine, for in them
the aim is absent. He finally defined those actions as omissive acts, namely, acts character-
ized by a failure to apply the required "finality" or teleology. Ibid., at 103-4.
I" Consult Welzel, Aktuelle Strafrechtsprobleme im Rahmen der finalen Handlungslehre,
Juristische Studiengesellschaft Karlsruhe 15, 16 (1953).
I- Ibid., at 15, 16. Welzel's distinction between "ethics of attitude" and "ethics of respon-
sibility" is derived largely from the social philosophy of Max Weber, who has stated that
"there is a most profound distinction between acting in accordance with the tenets of ethics
of attitude-speaking in religious terms, 'the Christian does right and leaves the result up to
God,' and acting in accordance with ethics of responsibility, whereby man is liable for the
[foreseeable] effects of his actions." Weber, Politik als Beruf, geistige Arbeit als Beruf 54
(1919). Weber, expressing the view that ethics of attitude are essentially absolute and not
concerned with results, says that such an ethics "is not a carriage which you can stop in
order to enter or leave according to whim. Rather all or nothing ... one must be a saint
in all, at least in intention, must live as did Jesus, the Apostles, St. Francis and the like
of him: then this ethics is meaningful and expresses dignity. Not otherwise." Ibid., at 54, 55.
"' The highest court of the Federal Republic of Germany in civil and criminal matters.
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actor is aware of the illegality of his act, but also where he wrongfully fails
to exert his conscience in order to ascertain whether or not the act he is
about to perform is legal.
Welzel's theory sheds light upon the responsibility not only of an actor
who, on the basis of a nonconforming personal ethical, religious, or political
conviction, regards the legal prohibition as actually "illegal" or immoral, but
also of one who, owing to his criminal background, has reached a mental state
which renders him incapable of realizing illegality. A logical consequence of
the theory of intent would be immunity of such persons, for their intent is
obviously not directed to law-violation. In order to subject them to legal
sanctions, that theory must treat their acts as constituting an exception.
Welzel's position, on the other hand, provides a basis for their punishment by
rendering them responsible for the wrongfulness of their choice.
Welzel's theory also bears importantly on error regarding justification
grounds. According to conventional doctrine, the presence of justification
grounds excludes the actus reus and erroneous belief in their presence excludes
intent. Welzel assumes that such grounds exclude illegality rather than the
actus reus and that error as to them may, but need not necessarily, exclude
guilt, depending on whether or not it is based on the actor's fault in not
recognizing his duty. The Bundesgerichtshof refused to follow Welzel's view
on this matter.
In Germany, despite the clear wording of Section 59 of the Penal Code,
dealing exclusively with error of fact, error of law has been accepted, by
judicial legislation, as a general defense to a charge of crime. This decisive
step was taken by the Great Senate for Criminal Matters of the Bundes-
gerichtshof on March 18, 1952.167 An attorney, convicted of the crime of
"coercion" under Section 240 of the Penal Code for having forced a client to
make certain payments of fees by threatening to cease representing her,
appealed on the ground that he believed himself entitled to act as he did.
The court below held this belief to be an irrelevant error of criminal law.
The following questions were submitted to the Great Senate: 16S
(1) Does guilt require not only knowledge of the factual circumstances of Section
240, subdiv. 2, but also consciousness that the act is illegal?
(2) If this question in answered in the affirmative, is the actor also guilty if he
lacked consciousness of illegality, where this was due to negligence? 169
After disposing of the preliminary question of the significance of the term
"illegal" in Section 240 by pointing out that it does not belong to the factual
1-2 BGHSt. 194 (1952).
'These questions were limited to interpretation of Section 240, Penal Code, which pro-
vides: "(1) A person who illegally, by force or threat of substantial harm, compels an act,
sufferance or omission of another shall be punished for coercion by imprisonment or fine....
(2) The act is illegal if the use of force or the threat of harm for the purpose intended is to
be deemed blameworthy. (3) The attempt is punishable."
"2 BGHSt. 194 (1952).
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circumstances of the crime as defined by the statute and thus has no bearing
on the actor's intent, 17 the court proceeded to discuss the problem of whether
or not, apart from that term, the actor, in order to be punishable, must have
been aware of the illegality of his conduct. It considered at length the theory
of the Reichsgericht that ignorance or error concerning the criminal law
constitutes no defense, and considered briefly the critique of this theory in
German doctrine and its abandonment in the Reform Drafts, beginning with
the Counter-Draft of 1911. It further noted that special statutes, such as the
Tax Law, the Foreign Exchange Law and the Economic Crimes Act, have
departed from the traditional view and accepted error of law as a defense.
The court, in reversing the Reichsgericht, finally made the following state-
ment, which marked the beginning of a new era of German jurisprudence:
Punishment presupposes guilt. Guilt is blameworthiness. In the negative value
judgment of guilt the actor is being blamed for not having conducted himself in
accordance with law, for having decided to do wrong although he could have con-
ducted himself in accordance with law or decided in favor of the law. The [inner]
ground upon which the guilt censure is based lies in the fact that man has the dispo-
sition toward free, responsible, ethical self-determination and is, therefore, able to
decide in favor of the law (right) and against the wrong. A prerequisite of man's
free, responsible, ethical self-determination in favor of the law and against the wrong
is knowledge of right and wrong (law and wrong) .... In some cases even a person
who possesses mental capacity may possess no consciousness of wrongdoing, because
he ignores or misconceives the prohibition of the law. In such case (also) the actor
is not in a position to decide against the wrong.171
From this basic position of guilt, in the sense of blameworthiness, being
the true ground of punishment-a position first suggested by Frank and
elaborated by Welzel-the court drew its further important conclusion that
error of law does not automatically result in immunity. For, in the opinion
of Frank, guilt admits of degrees, and in Welzel's view, man is responsible
beyond purity of intention. The actor's acquittal or conviction will turn upon
the absence or presence of guilt in not acquiring the necessary knowledge of
law. If convicted he must be punished more or less severely according to the
degree of his guilt:
[Man] does not conform to ... [the required duty of right conduct] by merely not
doing that which clearly appears to him to be wrong. He must rather, in everything
he is about to undertake, call to his consciousness whether it agrees with the dictates
of the legal ought. He must dispel doubts by thought and inquiry. This requires an
exertion of conscience; the degree [of exertion] is determined by the circumstances
of the case and by the life environment and occupation of the individual. If, notwith-
standing exertion of conscience as thus expected, he could not acquire the insight
into the wrongfulness of his conduct, the error was invincible and the act unavoidable
.7 The court stated that Section 240 defines "coercion" widely, and that the term illegal
has the function of narrowing the scope of the crime. Ibid., at 195-96.
' Ibid., at 200-201.
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[by him]. In this case, no blame of guilt can be raised against him. If, per contra,
the actor could have realized the wrongfulness of his conduct had he properly exerted
his conscience, error of law does not exclude guilt. But, depending on the measure to
which the actor had failed properly to exert his conscience, the blame of guilt is
correspondingly reduced.' 72
In other words, the actor must be acquitted if, notwithstanding proper
exertion of conscience, he did not realize the wrongfulness of his conduct. If
he falls short of this test, he must be convicted according to the degree to
which he failed to exert, as required under the circumstances, his conscience.
In such a case he must be convicted of the intentional crime as charged and
not of its negligent variant, if any.
In separate chapters, the court analyzed the theory underlying this ruling
from the point of view of criminal law doctrine. It stated that it had chosen
the theory of guilt in preference to the theory of intent and elaborately justi-
fied the choice thus made on grounds of legal policy. It pointed out that
while the theory of intent afforded the advantage of enabling courts to dis-
regard the distinction between error of law and error of fact, it carried the
weighty disadvantage of compelling acquittal in the absence of legal knowl-
edge even where the actor's error was due to his own fault.17 3 The court
also thought the theory of intent incapable of resolving the intricate problems
of legal error by a person whose crime is based on an inner religious, ethical,
or political conviction or on a total lack of legal sensitivity.
174
The problems raised by this leading case have been further elaborated and
resolved by numerous other decisions of the Bundesgerichtshof. We shall dis-
cuss these problems, beginning with those resolved in a manner which appears
open to criticism.
While the Bundesgerichtshof's treatment of error and guilt no longer neces-
- Ibid., at 201-2.
"' The theory of intent, said the court, "can arrive at punishment of an act as intentional
only if the actor, at the time of the act, possessed a consciousness of wrongdoing. But, as
everybody knows, this is frequently not the case. Many, and particularly grave, criminal
acts are being committed in strong emotional excitement, in the heat of passion or on the
spur of the moment. In this mental state, the actor, though acquainted with the prohibition,
often does not become conscious of it; nor is he able, under certain circumstances, to de-
liberate about the question of whether his conduct is wrong. The guilt blame is, neverthe-
less, justified, because he has omitted the expected exertion of conscience that would have
brought to his consciousness the wrongfulness of the act before he decided to commit it...
Ibid., at 206.
27' The court also dealt with the problem of judicial discretion in meting out punishment
in cases where the accused failed to exert his conscience. It ruled that the extent to which
such exertion may be expected is a reviewable question of law so far as it involves "the con-
tent and scope of a legal duty." Ibid., at 209. Determining to what extent an error of law
based on fault, which may but need not always result in mitigation of punishment, actually
justifies such mitigation was held a question of fact for the trial judge. In this matter the
judge is not bound by the minimum punishment provided for the crime in issue, but may
reduce the punishment down to the lowest penalty provided for attempt.
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sitates differentiation between error of criminal law and error of civil law, it
requires the more difficult differentiation between error of fact and error of
law. In the leading case, the Bundesgerichtshof admitted that the necessity of
maintaining this distinction was a significant disadvantage of the theory of
guilt. But the First Criminal Senate of that court soon considered it appro-
priate to justify the differential treatment of error of law and error of fact.
In a decision rendered on June 6, 1952,175 it said:
The person acting under a mistake regarding actual facts is in principle [an sick]
law-abiding; he wishes to conform to the dictates of the law and fails to do so solely
owing to error concerning the factual situation that gives rise to his act. This error
prevents him, as a rule, from recognizing the very possibility that he might be violat-
ing the law. To him applies, therefore, the idea of Section 59, Penal Code, that he
should be held responsible as if-provided that this is more advantageous to him-
the factual circumstances were not as they actually were but as he imagined them
to be....
The person acting under a mistake of law too misses the right way, but he does so
owing to an error of cognition in the area of the legal ought. In this instance it is
generally easier to recognize the law violation than in the case of a mistake of fact.
Both types of mistake may, in a concrete case, be equally avoidable, equally more
or less negligent and more or less reprehensible. Nevertheless, the person acting under
a mistake of fact, as a rule, deserves a lesser blame. Such mistake is generally
stronger and more direct and constitutes a stronger stimulus of action. It does not
place the actor, as a mistake of law mostly does, in a dilemma-obstructing action-
between that which he wants to do and that which he is allowed to do-a dilemma
that he must overcome-, but urges him to act or, at any rate, permits him to act
without legal qualms and ethical inhibitions. 176
Such was the apparent answer to the principal objection raised against the
distinctive treatment of the two types of error-an objection frequently dis-
cussed by Swiss writers-that an error of fact, in the last analysis, is admitted
as a defense solely on the ground that such error leads to the mistaken view
that the action is lawful and that this ground equally applies to an error of
law. But the rationalization advanced by the Bundesgerichtshof is not con-
vincing, even theoretically. Since the distinction between the two types of
error is frequently very tenuous, its practical value appears questionable.Y77
-3 BGHSt. 105 (1952). Defendants, managers and educators in an institution which
handled difficult educational cases, were convicted of the crimes of bodily injury, danger-
ous bodily injury, and maltreatment of children. They had punished the children partly
without reason and partly in excess of their legal right to punish. In reversing, the Bundes-
gerichtshof stated it to be an error of fact when defendants mistakenly assumed the exist-
ence of an objective reason to punish, but an error of law when the objective reason actually
existed and defendants misconceived the scope of the right to punish.
" Ibid., at 107.
"n Thus, 3 BGHSt. 82 (1952), reversed the conviction of an officer of a municipality for
the crime of removing documents in office. The accused, who refused to deliver to the mayor
records of a meeting, alleged that he did not know that these records were "documents"
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Under the Bundesgerichtshof's theory it becomes extremely important to
determine the exact scope of the actus reus. This is necessary because, under
that theory, intent comprises all elements of the actus reus but does not com-
prise the illegality of the conduct (the latter being the subject of conscious-
ness of illegality that constitutes guilt), and because lack of intent is treated
differently from lack of consciousness of illegality. In this context, the most
significant question concerns the correct classification of the so-called justi-
fication grounds, for on it depends the answer to the crucial question of
whether error concerning the existence of such ground is an error of fact or an
error of law. This problem was discussed in great detail in the proceedings of
the Fourth Session of the Great Criminal Law Commission, which met Febru-
ary 1-4, 1955.178 Conventional doctrine regards justification grounds as
"negative factual circumstances" of the crime and thus as negatively included
in the actus reus. Where they are present, they negative the actus reus. This
view, now represented by Mezger, is opposed by Welzel, who contends that
justification grounds bear on illegality rather than on the actus reus. Hence,
according to Welzel, belief in their presence bears on guilt or consciousness of
illegality rather than on the actus reus and thus on intent. Welzel criticizes the
doctrine of negative factual circumstances by pointing out that according to
this doctrine killing a man in self-defense cannot be distinguished from kill-
ing a mosquito, since neither act constitutes an actus reus. Dreher adds the
observation that the doctrine also leads to difficulties in the field of complicity
in crime committed in error as to justification grounds: A man who, well
knowing that no justification ground exists, aids another who believes that he
is acting in self-defense could not be punished because of the absence of an
actus reus. Notwithstanding the forcefulness of these arguments and its gen-
eral adherence to Welzel's conception of guilt, the Bundesgerichtshof assumed
justification grounds to be a negative part of the actus reus.
This position was expressed when the court held that teachers who errone-
ously assumed that there was an objective reason for their exercise of the right
to punish pupils acted under a mistake of fact, observing that a person thus
acting was "in principle, law-abiding." 179 The same view was expressed in
within the meaning of the law or that he had a duty to deliver them. It was held that,
a document being characterized at law by its "destiny" as proof, it was sufficient to consti-
tute intent that the defendant knew that the records had such "destiny." His belief that
they were not documents therefore was not an "error concerning the notion of a docu-
ment." The court thought defendant's failure to be aware of his duty to deliver the docu-
ments was an error of fact rather than of law, for the violation charged consisted of a
failure to act rather than of a positive act. This implies that the omission violated a duty,
the existence of which thus constitutes an essential part of the actus reus; the intent, there-
fore, must be directed to that duty.
I Consult Dreher, Die vierte Arbeitstagung der grossen Strafrechtskommission, Probleme
der Strafrechtsreform (Folge 4) Beilage zum Bundesanzeiger Nr. 76 (April 21, 1955).
173 BGHSt. 105 (1952).
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another decision, 80 which held that accused's belief that she had a claim to
the money she extorted, and was thus justified in acting as she did, was an
error of fact rather than of law.
The practical consequences of adhering to either the position that justifica-
tion grounds are negative factual circumstances excluding the actus reus or
the view that they are grounds excluding illegality depend to a large extent
on the type of crime that is involved. Only certain acts of negligence enumer-
ated in the special part of the Penal Code are subject to punishment. It fol-
lows that if belief that a justification ground exists excludes intent, the act
could be punishable only if negligent commission falls within one of these
enumerated crimes of negligence; otherwise the actor must go completely free.
On the other hand, if such belief merely bears on guilt, the actor would go
free only if that belief was not itself based on fault. The situations dealt with
by the Bundesgerichtshof afford illuminating examples of the operation of the
theory of negative factual circumstances, to which that tribunal adheres. The
educators who punished pupils believing that there was a justification for their
acting as they did would still be punished for negligent bodily injury if their
belief was itself negligent.' 8 ' The extortionist, who believed that she had a
claim upon the victim would go completely free, for the Penal Code contains
no provision for the punishment of negligent extortion.' 8 2
It appears that the Bundesgerichtshof was on better grounds when it fol-
lowed Welzel in determining the treatment of an accused who, with full
knowledge of the law, rejects it on conscientious grounds. The Great Senate
had mentioned this case as affording perhaps the most important reason for
adopting the normative theory. 8 3 The Bundesgerichtshof later applied the
view expressed by the Great Senate to the case of defendants who, on con-
scientious grounds, had violated a Hamburg Police Regulation prohibiting
promotion of a referendum against the remilitarization of Germany. 8 4 The
1804 BGHSt. 105 (1953). Accused, a prostitute, believed she had a claim against B for
services rendered and that she had a right to prevent him from leaving until he paid. She
called her husband who, by use of threats, caused B to deliver to him 1 Deutsche Mark.
The lower court, holding accused guilty of extortion, thought that the guilt might be di-
minished because of accused's erroneous assumption that the act was justified. The Bundes-
gerichtshof reversed, holding accused's belief that she was entitled to payment, though erro-
neous under civil law, to be an adequate defense to the charge of extortion (that crime being
predicated on the fact that the actor has no right to the advantage claimed). But accused
was to be held guilty of "coercion." The mistaken belief as to scope and limits of permissible
self-help, while an error of law, afforded no excuse since it was based on the accused's own
fault.
"' Consult discussion at 454 supra.
'= Consult note 180 supra. However, she was held guilty of another crime concurrently
committed.
1'2 BGHSt. 194, 206 (1952).
24BGHSt. (Dec. 23, 1952), reported in 6 NJW 432 (1953) (Neue Juristische Wochen-
schrift [New juristic Weekly], hereafter cited NJW).
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court said that if the error of law on which they relied was the belief that the
regulation was illegal, in the sense of being inconsistent with a higher moral
law, it afforded no defense for "whoever lives in a community must accept the
prevailing law also against himself."' 18 5 Clearly, the court assumed that the
defendants must be held responsible for having decided incorrectly, that is,
against the law. The purity of their intent was of no avail.
If guilt means blameworthiness within Welzel's conception of ethics of re-
sponsibility, then it is demanded of men not only that they have pure intent
but also that they exert their conscience to establish the right course of action.
Thus it is most important to determine what constitutes that exertion and by
what standards a man's exertion or his ability to exert his conscience is
adjudged. Here the Bundesgerichtshof adopted a complex standard composed
of both objective and subjective elements.
Where knowledge of the law is not readily accessible, an educated man,
even an attorney-just as a judge-might err. Indeed, one of the most signif-
icant features of the German decisional law of legal error is that many cases
deal with error of law by an attorney. One case involved, however, a physi-
cian who claimed to have believed himself entitled to participate in the Nazi
program of mass murder of inmates of institutions for the insane because this
participation enabled him to save some lives. It was held that, while his belief
was wrong at law, he might not have possessed the required "consciousness
that the act was wrongful."'1 6 The court emphasized that inquiry into the
presence of such consciousness was particularly suggested by the fact that the
question of whether or not, in a situation of common danger, a man may save
some lives at the expense of others is highly controversial.
However, precisely because the legal problem involved is often more diffi-
cult to solve than factual questions, the standard of care in exerting one's
conscience is higher than that required in negligence cases. Thus, the Bundes-
gerichtshof has said:
The principles for the evaluation of fault developed in connection with crimes of
negligence cannot be simply applied to the question whether a mistake of law is
caused by fault . . . [Mlan must, in all actions he is about to undertake, consider
whether they are in accord with the principles of the legal ought. He must eliminate
doubts by thinking and by seeking advice. For that, it is necessary that he exert his
conscience. The measure of exertion is determined by the circumstances of the case
and the life and occupation environment of the individual, and to this extent, by
tests which also apply to the question of whether a person has committed a crime
of negligence. But exertion of conscience is something different from the observance
of the care which the individual is expected to apply in order to avoid jeopardy or
Ibid.
BGHSt. (Nov. 28, 1952), reported in 6 NJW 513 (1953). For report and discussion of
this case consult Silving, Euthanasia: A Study in Comparative Criminal Law, 103 U. of Pa.
L. Rev. 350, 356-58 (1954).
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injury of legally protected interests. With regard to acquiring knowledge of illegality
of an actus reus, the requirements are greater than with regard to acquiring knowl-
edge of the factual circumstances themselves, because, as a rule, illegality is inherent
in the actus reus and because this is generally known. For this reason, the actor
must examine with special care whether in a particular case commission of the actus
reus is nevertheless permissible. 1 87
Obviously, the operative principle used by the court is the Roman canon-
law concept of vincibility or invincibility of the error. That concept, in the
German law, includes strong subjective elements. Where a decision concern-
ing legality or illegality of conduct is involved "the actor is required to apply
all his mental powers and all his ethical value judgments."'' 8 However, his
error will not be judged solely by the standard of the reasonable man. For the
same error may be superable for one man but insuperable for another. The
individual superability of error depends not only on the objective character
of the issue but also on the intellectual qualities of the actor, that is, the
ability peculiar to him to evaluate the particular situation with which he is
faced. In applying this subjective test, the court came close to breaking down
the limits of the insanity test. In one of its decisions8 9 it held the ignorance
of two mentally retarded farm-hands of the prohibition of sexual intercourse
with an insane woman to have been invincible. The peculiarity of the case, in
the opinion of the court, was that the defendants, while in possession of full
mental capacity within both the insanity and diminished responsibility tests,
had, owing to their lack of education, never even remotely imagined that such
act might be forbidden. It thus did not occur to them to inquire. Nor would
inquiry have been of any avail, for their ignorance was shared by the local
mayor. However they might have exerted their conscience, their primitiveness
stood in the way of acquiring the necessary knowledge. Thus, the error,
superable by a person of higher intellectual and moral quality, was insuperable
for them.
Since the introduction of the defense of error of law in Germany, innumer-
able cases have been decided on that ground. The wide range of importance
attributed to such error may be best conveyed by correcting the description
of the contention of error of law as a defense. It is not a technical defense at
-4 BGHSt. 236, 242-43 (1953). The lower court convicted accused, a police officer, of
embezzlement for giving unused ration cards to merchants in return for contributions to a
police benefit fund. The Bundesgerichtshof reversed on the ground that accused had derived
no profit from the action, the crime of embezzlement requiring that the actor desire to
"acquire" the thing "for himself." However, the court found the act a violation of Section 11
of the Economic Crimes Law, even though the lower court had upheld accused's defense
that he thought himself entitled to give away the cards. The Bundesgerichtshof held that
the court below had not properly ruled on the standard of care required in the exertion of
conscience.
' BGHSt. (Dec. 23, 1952), reported in 6 NJW 431, 432 (1953).
' BGHSt. (Oct. 6, 1953), reported in Juristische Rundschau 188 (1954).
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all, for where there are doubts as to the existence of legal error, those doubts
must be resolved in favor of the defendant. 190 His knowledge of law must be
proven by the prosecution as part of his guilt. 191
III. POINTS IN ISSUE
The import of the statement that knowledge of illegality is of the essence
of crime depends on the definition given "illegality." Without specification of
the meaning of that term, the statement might fit into a positivist framework
of thought as well as into a framework based on a theory of responsibility
within a free society. Thus, while owing much to the German theory of
responsibility-that there can be no guilt without intent based upon knowl-
edge (psychological theory of guilt)-the Soviet theory of criminal law as-
sumes that such knowledge must encompass the social dangerousness of the
act, rather than its non-conformance with law.' 92 Social dangerousness, of
course, is the central concept of positivist thought, and Soviet jurists have
derived it from the Italian school. In a consistent normative theory of respon-
sibility, illegality, knowledge of which is a requisite of punishment, should
have a distinctive connotation. Its meaning cannot be determined either by
purely social or by purely practical considerations. A survey of various con-
cepts of illegality will facilitate presentation of our own position.
Anglo-American Law
Neither in England nor in the United States has there been a consistent
approach to the problem of the scope of required legal knowledge, even in the
rare cases where such knowledge has been considered. In England several
opinions on the subject were voiced in the famous case of Regina v. Prince.9 3
Brett, J., suggested that knowledge that the act constitutes a crime lesser than
'o Consult decision of the Bavarian Oberlandesgericht (March 2, 1954), reported in 7
NJW 811 (1954).
"The fact that the requirement of legal knowledge as a condition of criminal responsi-
bility was introduced in Germany by judicial legislation rather than-as might be expected
in German law-by statutory amendment, deserves notice. To understand this fact, we
must consider the place of guilt in the structure of crime under German law. Guilt is deemed
to be a jurisprudential "pre-statutory" requirement of criminality; that is, an inherent or
self-evident requirement, not merely undefined by statute but, indeed, not definable in exact
statutory terms. Consult Wehzel, Das Deutsche Strafrecht 44 (4th ed., 1954). Dreher, op. cit.
supra note 178, mentions that all participants of the Fourth Session of the Great Criminal
Law Commission agreed that there should be no definition of either guilt or intent or negli-
gence in the Code. Thus, should the rule on error of law ever be incorporated in the German
Penal Code, it would be the only statutory rule partially defining guilt.
192 Consult notes 132 and 133 supra, and 232 infra. The Soviet view that knowledge of
illegality is awareness of the social dangerousness of the act has greatly influenced recent
Polish thought. Andrejew, Lernell and Sawicki, Prawo Karne Polski Ludowej 188 (1950),
state that "[o]ur position is that in the People's Poland, a necessary condition of imputing
to the actor intentional guilt is consciousness of the dangerousness of the act."
" L.R. 2 Cr.Cas.Res. 154, 13 Cox C.C. 138 (1875).
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the one charged is sufficient. Denman, J., believed that knowledge of the tor-
tious nature of the act would be enough, while Bramwell, J., thought that the
actor must be aware of moral wrong-doing. Kenny reports that the latter view
is approved by eminent text-writers, although "it must be remembered that it
was only an obiter dictum.' 194 An interesting view was advanced in the
United States in Long v. State.195 There the Delaware Supreme Court sug-
gested that, in determining the scope of expected legal knowledge, it is signif-
icant to consider the prevailing jurisprudential conception of law as a pre-
diction of what courts will do in the future.
Swiss Law
The Swiss definition of illegality for purposes of the requirement of legal
knowledge was formulated in Ritter gegen Statthalteramt Zfirich, 96 where
the Federal Tribunal said that the actor need not:
know the pertinent provision imposing the prohibition and the punishment; rather
consciousness of illegality exists whenever the actor has the feeling that he is violat-
ing the law, whether it be the rights of others or general dictates of the legal system,
or, without having precise notions, that he is violating that which is right. Only con-
sciousness of wrongdoing is in issue.197 [Italics added.]
This much-cited rule9 s resolves the problems of the intensity and of the con-
tent of legal knowledge. As we have seen, Swiss law rejects the excuse of
ignorance, as distinct from mistake.199 It is also perhaps the only law which
concerns itself with the problem of intensity of knowledge, declaring itself
satisfied, however, with a minimum intensity. Any feeling, however vague,
that the act might be prohibited or wrong is sufficient.2 0 0
With regard to the content and proof of knowledge, the Federal Tribunal,
apparently adopting the distinction between mala in se and mala prohibita,
differentiated between error concerning major offenses and error concerning
police regulations. It said in the Ritter case:
In some cases (e.g., violation of property rights) consciousness of illegality is
comprised in the very knowledge and desire [will] of the objective elements of the
crime; for whoever, without being authorized, infringes upon other people's rights.
' Kenny, Outlines of Criminal Law 53-54 (15th ed., 1936). Consult also Williams, op. cit.
supra note 72, at 151-54.
1944 Del. 262, 65 A.2d 489 (1949).
aBGE 60 1412 (1934). I Ibid., at 218.
The Federal Tribunal has consistently followed the standard established by this rule,
even after the Penal Code of 1937 became effective. Cf. Gdrner gegen Statthalteramt
Luzern-Stadt, BGE 70 IV 97 (1944).
1" Consult discussion at 445 supra.
'Thus in Staatsanwaltschaft des Kantons Basel-Land gegen L,, BGE 75 IV 150 (1949),
accused's instinctive awareness of the prohibition of sexual intercourse with children was
sufficient to constitute knowledge of illegality.
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by his very conduct, acts consciously illegally, without it being necessary for him to
know special rules of law. In the field of police regulations this is not necessarily so.
A conduct may "violate police law" even though its wrongfulness is not, in accordance
with general opinion, evident. Hence, in this field, one can speak of consciously illegal
acts or omissions only where the actor knew the norm or prohibition that he violated
or at least had a suspicion that he might be violating a police rule or instruction, and
nevertheless acted as he did, thus consciously accepting the risk of a law violation
(dolus eventualis).201
As regards major offenses, the distinction between the rule laid down by the
court and the presumption of legal knowledge arising from commission of
the actus reus is very tenuous. The inference of legal knowledge is drawn
from consciousness that there is no justification for the act. This is shown by
a case in which the defendant was indicted under the Espionage Act of June
21, 1935, for having attempted to inform to German authorities against mem-
bers of a ski-club with whom he had a personal feud.2 0 2 The information,
which by accident fell into the hands of Swiss authorities, was addressed to
the German Customs Office, and upon its face charged the persons concerned
with violation of foreign exchange regulations and with smuggling. But it was
held that the information was intended to cause their arrest on political
grounds. This fact, in the court's view, also disposed of the question of de-
fendant's awareness of violating the espionage law:
This implies that the appellant possessed the consciousness of illegality which is
required for intent under Art. 11, Federal Criminal Law. For this [law] does not
require direct knowledge of the pertinent penal provision; rather, the actor's feeling
of doing something prohibited is sufficient (BGE 60 1 418). This emotional certainty,
in cases of acts which are in themselves injurious, is implicit in the very conscious-
ness of the absence of a ground justifying the injury.203
The distinction drawn in the Ritter case between error as to major offenses
and error as to police regulations would seem to suggest adoption of a liberal
rule with regard to the latter. But the Ritter case itself shows that the con-
trary is true. In that case, defendant, a German citizen, had had his residence
permit renewed with the proviso that he could not engage in any gainful occu-
pation except within a specific trade. He was fined for having assumed the
functions of a house manager without compensation and his defense was that,
in his understanding, a gratuitous occupation did not fall within the prohibi-
tion. The Federal Tribunal held any occupation that deprived others of the
opportunity of work to be included and, rejecting the view adopted by the
court below "that the accused as a merchant can be assumed to have some
'Ritter gegen Statthalteramt Zrich, BGE 60 I 412, 418 (1934).
' Schmitt gegen Basel-Stadt, Staatsanwaltschaft, BGE 66 I 107 (1940).
21Ibid., at 112-13.
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understanding of the duties relating to the policing of aliens and their signif-
icance,12 0 4 said:
It is unnecessary to determine whether it is generally known that alien residents
require a permit for activities such as here in issue, and it is unnecessary to discuss
whether the appellant had reason to regard the activity with which he is charged as
one directed to gain. It is sufficient that he must have realized that he was perform-
ing functions, the performance of which might be generally considered on the labor
market as affording an opportunity of gainful employment and that they must cer-
tainly or, at least, very likely be deemed by the competent authority as a perform-
ance of an employment and, hence, as requiring a permit.20
In another case the Federal Tribunal held that although the traffic law and
regulation which the accused violated were not generally known, the accused
should have known that driving as he did was dangerous. 20 6
The Federal Tribunal has rather summarily disposed of the contention that
an accused, while aware of the prohibition imposed by law involving a major
offense, should not be convicted because he acted on conscientious grounds.2 0 7
German Law
In contrast to Swiss law, the new German law205 assumes, in terms at least,
that knowledge of illegality means knowledge of legal prohibition. Thus, the
leading case defines consciousness of illegality by saying: "The actor knows
that what he does is legally not permitted but prohibited.... Error concerning
illegality is error concerning the prohibition (VerbotsirrtuM).' '209
Until recently the conception of the legal prohibition that is the object of
required knowledge was rather broad. That prohibition need be neither the
legal rule as formulated in the Penal Code nor even the particular prohibition
that has been violated. In one decision the First Criminal Senate of the
Bundesgerichtshof held that the requirement of legal knowledge necessary
for conviction of the crime of sexual intercourse with in-laws was satisfied by
I Ritter gegen Statthalteramt ZUrich, BGE 60 1 412, 419 (1934).
Ibid., at 420.
'Baumann gegen Staatsanwaltschaft des Kantons Aargau, BGE 75 IV 131 (1949). Cf.
Statthalteramt Zirich gegen Hodel, BGE 81 IV 191 (1955), where accused, although he
knew licenses were required for special sales, claimed that he had no consciousness of wrong-
doing in conducting such a sale without a license because he believed his sale was not of the
type requiring a license. Accused had made no inquiries as to the correctness of his views,
believing the authorities were likely in any event to inform him that the sale was illegal.
The Federal Tribunal reversed his acquittal and held mitigation under Article 20, Penal
Code, not applicable for, under the circumstances, accused lacked "the feeling not to do
wrong." Ibid., at 196.
. Consult note 243 infra.
-' Since the leading decision of 2 BGHSt. 194 (1952). For discussion consult 450 supra.
-2 BGHSt. 194, 196-97 (1952).
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accused's knowledge of the prohibition of adultery,210 because the two prohi-
bitions were oriented to protection of the "same or a closely related legal
interest." 21' The same result was reached by the Fifth Criminal Senate in an
earlier case.21 2 That Senate assumed, however, that before knowledge of one
legal prohibition could be substituted for knowledge of another, both prohibi-
tions must be based on the same policy ("inner ground") and protect the
same legal interest.
The position of the Bundesgerichtshof has been criticized by many
writers. 213 One critic alleged that the position assumes the existence of a
"wrong in itself"21 4 while another claimed that it threatens the very existence
of the principle nulla poena sine lege.21 5 The question has been raised whether
the wrongfulness to which knowledge must be directed is something contained
in the Penal Code at all or rather only an ethical quality.216 As a result of such
criticism, the Bundesgerichtshof assumed a new orientation. The Fourth
Senate, in a decision rendered December 6, 1956, rejected the theory of in-
divisibility of the consciousness of illegality,217 stating that knowledge of one
prohibition cannot serve as a substitute for knowledge of another prohibition
and that the contrary view implies acceptance of the doctrine of versari in re
illicita, which was repudiated by German law.218 The German theory of legal
error-meaning error with regard to illegality rather than immorality-is still
threatened by the Great Senate's requirement of exertion of conscience for the
purpose of acquiring the necessary knowledge. 21 9 However, while it apparently
rejected Binding's scheme, according to which illegality is a feature of the
203 BGHSt. 342 (1952).
'The court said: "Everybody knows that adultery violates not only the moral law but
also the legal order. Nor did the accused.., rely on unawareness of the criminality of adult-
ery. If, however, he was conscious of the wrongfulness of the act as constituting adultery,
this consciousness comprised the illegality of his act generally. For consciousness of illegal-
ity ... is not divisible, simply because it does not include knowledge of the manner in which
the legal order punishes the wrong committed by the act. This applies particularly in cases
where the several criminal statutes violated by the act protect the same or a closely related
legal interest. . . ." Ibid., at 343.
- BGHSt. (April 10, 1952), reported in 5 NJW 671 (1952).
- Consult Zimmermann, Unteilbares oder tatbestandsbezogenes Unrechtsbewusstsein? 7
NJW 908, 909 (1954); Bindokat, Kritisches zum Verbotsirrtum, 8 Juristenzeitung 71
(1953); Warda, Tatbestandsbezogenes Unrechtsbewusstsein, 6 NJW 1052 (1953).
21 Bindokat, op. cit. supra note 213, at 73.
21Zimmermann, op. cit. supra note 213.
21 Ibid. Bindokat, op. cit. supra note 213.
21 10 NJW 229 et seq. (1957). The First and Fifth Senates have indicated that they will
henceforth take the same position. Consult ibid., at 229, 230.
'This was done by adoption of Section 56, Penal Code (text of Sept. 1, 1953, BGBI.
I 1083), providing that accused is not responsible for consequences of an act unless he
caused these very consequences by conduct at least negligent.
2 BGHSt. 194 (1952).
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actus reus,220 the Great Senate did adopt, on the whole, his positivist concep-
tion of "norm" as the content of required legal knowledge. Under this theory,
that which the actor must know is the "norm" behind the positive legal pro-
hibition, and it is unnecessary that he know the criminal code. But the actor
must know that the act he is about to perform is prohibited.22' His evaluation
of that act is different from that of the judge who later considers its criminal-
ity. The actor merely asks himself: "May I or mustn't I?" His conclusion that
he mustn't means that he considers the act contrary to duty or prohibited.
His process of arriving at that conclusion is a process-unconscious perhaps-
of subsumption of the act under the norm that prohibits it. Binding described
that process as a layman's subsumption and emphasized that a layman can
hardly be expected to engage in more sophisticated technical legal reasoning.
Mezger developed this idea into the notion of "parallel evaluation [of the act]
in the lay sphere of the actor. '222 He defined this evaluation as one "within
the thought-compass and environment of the individual, having an orientation
parallel to the statutory-judicial evaluation.1223 Mezger's view was, in turn,
adopted by the Bundesgerichtshof, in an opinion summarized as follows:
No one can expect the actor to formulate a complete conceptual definition of a
"document"; were that the case, only criminal lawyers-and, indeed, only adherents
of the prevailing view-could commit a crime concerning a document; it is, there-
fore, sufficient for the actor to know that the writing he forges is expected to claim
significance and credit in social life; a man possesses consciousness of the lewdness
of his conduct as soon as he knows that he does something indecent or improper in
the sexual sphere.224
That norm which is reflected in the lay sphere is, in Binding's view, a
provision of positive law rather than of morality. So also is the prohibition to
which reference is made by the Bundesgerichtshof a provision of positive law.
However, as we have seen, the Bundesgerichtshof assumes that a layman may
acquire knowledge of that prohibition by exertion of his conscience. This ap-
parent inconsistency can be resolved-only partially, to be sure-in the light
of the present belief, prevailing in Germany, in the tangential nature of law
and morality. Basically, the law required to be known is positive law (or its
reflection in the lay mind), but that law is assumed to incorporate a minimum
standard of morality and to be valid only to the extent that it conforms to
certain basic conceptions of justice prevailing among civilized nations.
The Bundesgerichtshof has expressed the above position in two cases, one
of which answered questions submitted by the appellate court of Hamburg.
' 2 Binding, op. cit. supra note 23, at 161, 230. 2 3 ibid., at 148.
'Mezger, Strafrecht, ein Lehrbuch 328 (1931).
' Ibid. If the actor is a lawyer he may be held to a legal "parallel evaluation."
'Maurach, op. cit. supra note 133, at 230, citing 3 BGHSt. 82, 248 (1952), discussed at
note 177 supra.
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That court, on intricate jurisprudential grounds which it thought applicable
to the special circumstances of this case, desired to depart from the previous
ruling of the Great Senate which required the exertion of conscience. De-
fendants were convicted by the trial court of having violated, on conscientious
grounds, a Hamburg Police Ordinance which prohibited promoting a referen-
dum against the remilitarization of Germany. The appellate court pointed out
that while the trial court had failed to consider the issue of defendants' con-
sciousness of illegality, there were grave doubts as to the appropriateness of
that issue to a criminal provision for the protection of public order:
In... in cases where the person concerned believes that he must not submit to an
ordinance, e.g., on basic political grounds, he neither fails to exert his conscience nor
omits inquiry. In such cases, in the opinion of the Senate [of the appellate court],
ethical evaluations cannot afford a standard for the correct attitude of the criminal,
while the general social need for order calls for dispensing with examination of the
psychological process where the mental attitude toward lawful conduct may be pre-
dominantly influenced by, for example, the basic political philosophy and approach
of the particular actor.225
The Bundesgerichtshof summarily disposed of the rather simple problem
posed by the case: Since defendants knew the Hamburg Police Ordinance,
there was no need to inquire into the question whether they exerted their con-
science or whether such exertion could have been of any avail under the cir-
cumstances. However, the Bundesgerichtshof proceeded to deal with the
broader jurisprudential issue raised by the appellate court, namely, the treat-
ment of error of law based on rejection, rather than on ignorance or mistaken
view of the law. The court took the position that if the actor knows that his
conduct is prohibited it is irrelevant that he denies the validity of the prohibi-
tion. In such a case there is no error of law. The actor must be punished be-
cause "[w]hoever lives in a community must accept the prevailing law also
as against himself." 226 There may be an error of law, however, where the
actor violates a known legal prohibition in the belief that it violates a higher
law, for example, the constitution. In this case, contrary to the view of the
appellate court, inquiry into the question of whether or not the defendant
exerted his conscience is required.227
I BGHSt. (Dec. 23, 1952), reported in 6 NJW 431, 432 (1953).
"'Ibid., at 432. The court further pointed out that there can be no distinction, in the
treatment of error of law, between criminal provisions "for the protection of public order"
and other criminal provisions.
I In view of the fact that the question of the constitutionality of Germany's remilitari-
zation was controversial, it may be assumed that belief in its unconstitutionality is governed
by the ruling in BGHSt. of Nov. 28, 1952 (note 186 supra). It may be further assumed that
the accused properly exerted his conscience in order to find the solution to the constitutional
question. Since the court did not resolve these problems, the suggested solutions are but
conjectural.
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In the second case the defendant was convicted by the trial court of the
crime of false imprisonment in office for having, in 1941, as Police President
of N., participated in the compulsory deportation of Jews to Riga, in accord-
ance with orders of the Reich Security Office.2 2 8 The appellate court reversed
that conviction on the ground that there was no proof of defendant's knowl-
edge of the illegality of these orders. The Bundesgerichtshof reversed and
remanded the case for further inquiry regarding the issue of legal error. Even
should it be found in a future trial that defendant possessed no consciousness
of illegality,229 it would be necessary-in the opinion of the Bundesgerichtshof
-further to find whether he could have acquired the necessary knowledge
had he properly exerted his conscience. The problem of proper exertion must,
in turn, be viewed in relation to the nature of the order which accused alleges
to have believed lawful. The trial court was to be guided by the following:
The more clearly the error of the actor is related to an area which the legal order
regulated in a certain manner but which it might have regulated in a different manner
without exceeding the limits set to the law creating power, the more justified will
be the assumption-depending on the personality of the actor-that the error was
unavoidable even in case of a proper exertion of conscience. On the other hand, the
more definitely the circumstances suggest the question whether measures of the kind
under examination are at all compatible with the esteem of human dignity, the more
readily will it have to be assumed that the actor would have answered the question
of right or wrong correctly had he-as required-exerted his conscience. 230
Thus the Bundesgerichtshof, following earlier views expressed by Welzel,
tends to extend the scope of individual responsibility within the framework of
exertion of conscience by requiring the individual to examine the ultimate
ethical validity of positive legal enactments. Welzel and Maurach, on the
other hand, now seem to question the necessity of a present actual conscious-
ness of illegality, expressing the view that it is sufficient if the actor "knew or
could recognize the illegality" of the act.231 Under this view possibility of
knowledge is equivalent to knowledge. Both the position of the Bundesgerichts-
hof and of Welzel and Maurach are under vigorous attack by adherents of
the psychological theory on the ground that both positions tend to obliterate
the distinction between intentional and negligent guilt and result in the ab-
surdity of "intentional guilt incurred by negligence.
'232
-3 BGHSt. 357 (1952).
'The orders were held to have been objectively illegal as ultra vires of any state. The
court proceeded from the assumption, prevailing in Germany, that a positive legal enact-
ment is not "law" when it violates certain principles of human conduct developed on the
basis of the concurrent ethical conceptions of all civilized nations.
'3 BGHSt. 357, 366 (1952).
Consult Wezel, op. cit. supra note 163, at 130; Maurach, op. cit. supra note 133, at 410.
Consult Maurach, op. cit. supra note 133, at 410-11.
19571
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
Soviet Law
Ferri,23 3 criticizing the classical doctrine's denial of the relevance of motive
in criminal law, has developed a notion of criminal responsibility predicated
upon the concurrence of the three psychological conditions of will, intent and
purpose. Will pertains to the act in itself: thus, a gun explosion may be vol-
untary or accidental. Intent is directed to the end to be accomplished: one
draws a gun in order to kill, wound, scare or make a noise. Purpose is oriented
to the effect which one wishes to accomplish by these means: one draws a gun
in order to kill, but for the purpose of taking revenge, of stealing, of defending
oneself or of executing a legal command. Criminal responsibility presupposes
that there be not only the will to perpetrate an act, but also the intent to
violate the law for an anti-social or anti-legal purpose. The more or less anti-
social quality of the act and of its end, combined with the more or less anti-
social quality of the actor determines the degree of social and legal responsi-
bility and the punishment to be imposed. The anti-social or anti-legal pur-
pose being an essential of responsibility, it is, of course, necessary that the
actor be aware of that character of his purpose.
Ferri's conception of illegality is reflected in the Soviet view regarding the
criminal character of an act and the scope of required knowledge, while the
Soviet idea of responsibility itself is of German origin. The official treatise on
criminal law states:
We have in mind not the actor's knowledge of the legal qualification of the act
but rather knowledge of its general dangerousness to the Soviet system or social
order, established by the workers' and peasants' authority at the time of its progress
toward a communist system.28 4
While an actor is not subject to punishment unless he knows the social
dangerousness of the crime, knowledge of social dangerousness may render
him liable even where the act is not proscribed by statute. It is sufficient that
it is an act punishable on the basis of analogy, the Soviet law recognizing
analogy as a source of criminal law.23 5 Thus, social dangerousness that is the
subject of legal knowledge reaches beyond the confines of written criminal
law.
IV. CONCLUSION
There is a noticeable trend toward increasing recognition of error of law as
a defense in several legal systems. The basis of this development differs ac-
:' For citations of Ferri's writings on this subject consult Vidal, I Cours de Droit Criminel
et de Science Pdnitentiaire 182 n. 1 (9th ed., Magnol, 1949).
'Viun, Ugolovnoe Pravo, Obschaya Chast 341 (4th ed., 1948), cited in Kirichenko,
op. cit. supra note 77, at 23.
Utevsky, Vina v Sovietskom Ugolovnom Pravie 226 (1950), cited in Kirichenko, op. cit.
supra note 77, at 23-24.
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cording to underlying ideology. In thought oriented to the community rather
than to the individual, the essence of illegality is the anti-social nature of the
act, and the rationale of defense measures is the social dangerousness of the
offender: by committing the act in awareness of its danger to society the
offender demonstrates his own dangerousness. According to Ferri, the origi-
nator of this sociological orientation in criminal law, the anti-social motive of
the actor is the decisive element in crime. The motive to cause social harm
presupposes knowledge of the danger.236 Excusable error of law is error con-
cerning the social dangerousness of the act.
We believe that disparate application of sanctions according to individual
motive is wrong. Within what we have chosen to call the ideology of free
society, the central concept is a normative one. The prohibition of the law is
addressed to the individual as a responsible agent; it is so addressed to all
individuals alike. Individual motives vary infinitely in intensity, and response
to them varies with the degree of capacity to resist, while intent is assumed
to be uniform. 237 In asserting motive to be irrelevant and intent solely deter-
minative, prevailing law expresses-unconsciously perhaps-a basic belief in
individual freedom of choice, which implies capacity to resist strong motiva-
tions. This refusal of present law, on the basis of individual motivations,
disparately to apply sanctions is also a refusal to tamper with the rational
link-essential in a free society-between conduct and punishment.238 How-
ever, motive should be considered in differentiating crime to the extent that a
statute may characterize certain conduct in terms of motive, for example,
euthanasia. Capacity to resist should be deemed relevant only where the type
of conduct proscribed is a failure to exert resistance to motivation. Beyond
that, motive and capacity to resist should be considered, except in case of the
mentally ill, only in mitigation of punishment.
Within the concept of responsibility, conceived to imply a basic freedom
of choice, knowledge of the law is essential for there can be no choice without
knowledge. In answering the crucial question-For what is man responsible?
-Binding, the most ardent advocate of the defense of legal error, stated that
criminality was defiance of the legal prohibition, a contempt of the law or a
rebellion against its commands. 23 9 The idea that the essence of law violation
'Ferri's stress on motive rather than intent (consult Vidal, op. cit. supra note 233) is
reflected in provisions even in countries which do not otherwise follow his ideology. Cf.,
e.g., German Penal Code (1953) § 211; Korean Penal Code (1953) § 152(2).
Consideration of individual motives would require a grant of almost unlimited discre-
tion to judges, a discretion that is incompatible with the principle of nulla poena sine lege.
Consult Cardozo, Paradoxes of Legal Science 104 (1928). Actually the positivist stress
on motive as distinct from intent has been criticized as psychologically unsound. Mayer,
op. cit. supra note 120, at 106 et seq., states that both intent and motive are included in the
psychological category of Vorstellung (psychological image).
SI1 Binding, op. cit., supra note 23, at 56 et seq.
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is "rebellion against the law," however, implies that every lawbreaker is a
revolutionary. We believe that in a free society the sanction of the com-
munity is imposed neither for "rebellion" nor for "disobedience" but simply
for violation of a duty toward the community-the actor's duty, as a member
of the community, to abide by its rules. To be subject to a sanction thus con-
ceived, the actor, as a free agent, must know the rule which he violates. 240
The duty of free men, however, is not exhausted merely by compliance with
known law. They must also exert their conscience to ascertain what the law is.
This we conceive to be a political rather than a moral duty, indeed, a form
of the individual's participation in the process of finding and creating law.241
However, a distinction must be drawn between violation of known law and
failure of exertion. As pointed out in the Introduction, responsibility is not
an absolute concept, but varies with the nature of the sanction it carries.
Thus, within a consistent framework of responsibility, the full rigor of punish-
ment provided for a crime need not be imposed when that crime is committed
in error of law which results from a failure to exert the conscience. Such dis-
parity can be further justified on the theory that one sanction is designed to
discourage the commission of acts known to be illegal, while the other is de-
signed to encourage knowledge of the law.242 Equal punishment for crimes
that are not equally blameworthy violates the principle that no excessive
punishment, indeed no punishment beyond that which is clearly necessary,
should be imposed. While a person may be subject to a sanction even though
he was not aware of the legal prohibition, if he failed to exert his conscience,
the policy upon which that sanction is based is entirely different from.that
underlying punishment of the principal crime. A minor punishment may in
such case serve the deterrent and curative purpose of the law as well as the
more severe penalty. In a free society the deterrent effect is to be sought by
effective enforcement of public order and not by its severity.
Man in a free society can tolerate only an essential minimum of restric-
'This interpretation is dearly implied in due process, as conceived in Screws v. United
States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945). The difference between vague and uncertain and clear and defi-
nite terms is one of degree. Only where the offender knows the law (as later interpreted)
can the requirement of definiteness and of nulla poena sine lege be said to be truly fulfilled.
Compare also Long v. State, 44 Del. 262, 65 A.2d 489 (1949) (discussed note 125 supra),
regarding the indefiniteness of the common law.
'" If, after proper exertion of his conscience, the individual arrives at a conception of the
law which does not conform with that established by courts, he is excused. At least, so far
as the particular case is concerned, his conception of law thus, in a sense, prevails. It is this
result that is being criticized by adherents of the supremacy of the law, as permitting law-
breakers to triumph over the law. But, as shown above, this "triumph" in n& way detracts
from the objective validity of the law, unless a nonconforming conception in course of
time proves to be so widely spread as to lead to amendment by way of customary law,
where such amendment is admissible. Customary law, of course, is a most democratic method
of law creation; a rule which allows amendment by that method is within the spirit of a
free society.
' Consult Romagnosi, 2 Genesi del Diritto Penale §§ 1364-68 (6th ed., 1836).
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tions. These restrictions must be well defined and known to him in advance
of the act. As punishment must not be imposed except within the limits of
statutory definition strictly construed, neither should it be imposed unless
the crime was committed with knowledge of the legal prohibition. As a moral,
social, or religious prohibition alone does not afford a proper standard of legal
punishment under the principle of no punishment without law, so knowledge
of such prohibition alone does not satisfy the principle of no punishment with-
out culpability. However reprehensible may have been the acts of Nazi offi-
cials, committed pursuant to authority of National Socialist legislation, we
believe that German decisions which punished those officials on the ground
that they had made a wrong moral choice violated these essential principles
of democratic law. Nor can the problem of responsibility wholly depend on
the issue of the validity of National Socialist laws from the point of view of a
higher law. For assuming the Nazi laws to have been invalid under some such
higher law, there was still no valid legal basis for punishment of those who
obeyed them. There was at best a legal vacuum. Moreover, as the defense of
subjective error of law does not impair the objective validity of law, neither
does the objective invalidity of a law exclude a defense based on its formal
apparent validity. Nor should knowledge of one prohibition substitute for
knowledge of another, and, a fortiori, knowledge of the tortious nature of an
act should not substitute for knowledge of its criminality. Requisite knowl-
edge of the law, however, cannot be understood to mean knowledge of the
statutory text or of the concrete type or degree of punishment, although belief
that an act constitutes merely a minor offense when in fact it is a major crime
should be considered as a ground of mitigation.
In positing non-conformance with law as the ground of punishment we do
not assume an authoritative concept of law which demands blind conform-
ance. Conformance is rather understood to mean an autonomous political
judgment of agreement or the political decision to be law-abiding. This
formulation raises the significant problem of how to treat the criminal who
acts because of a moral, political, or religious conviction which is contrary to
the value judgment expressed in the law. Even though ideally immunity
should be accorded to such an offender, in realistic terms he must be punished.
In the German view, as we have seen, he is punished because he made a
wrong choice. This view, however, assumes that the choice of the law is neces-
sarily "right" and the opposing view of the individual "wrong." It is prefer-
able to base punishment in such cases on the fundamental democratic princi-
ple of majority rule and the exclusiveness of legal amending processes. It
would seem proper, however, that mitigation be accorded to the conscientious
objector.2 43
'Article 64 of the Swiss Penal Code (1937) provides for discretionary mitigation of
punishment where the actor was prompted by "an honorable motive." But Meier und
Mitangeklagte gegen Staatsanwaltschaft des Kantons ZUrich, BGE 70 IV 181 (1944), held
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The requisite degree of intensity of legal knowledge has been repeatedly
discussed by the Swiss Federal Tribunal. That court declared that any intui-
tive feeling, however vague, that the act is wrong is sufficient to satisfy the
requirement of legal knowledge. The problem is significant, for knowledge is
not always clearly either present or absent. Between these extremes there are
stages of unconscious, preconscious, and partial knowledge. But the logical
meaning of a rule of law cannot be felt. At any given time, it can only be
known, unknown, partially known, or mistaken; knowable, unknowable, par-
tially or mistakenly knowable. The test should be the following: The accused
need not, at the crucial time, have thought of the prohibition. But if then
asked whether or not the act he was about to perform was lawful, he must
have been able to give a correct answer or, for purposes of the rule on exerting
conscience, to reach such an answer by exertion.2 44 By correct answer we mean
a formulation of the prohibition as above indicated.
Lastly, the difficulty of proving legal knowledge is not in itself greater than
is the difficulty of showing the presence of any other mental element. When a
man shoots another in broad daylight from a distance of five feet, he will not,
in the absence of special circumstances, be heard to say that he believed the
target to be a hare. Nor would any man-in legal systems which admit error
of law as a defense-be heard to say that he did not know the killing of a
human being to be unlawful. The problem of proof changes with circum-
stances. A man who shoots another might well be heard to say he thought the
target a hare if he had shot, in a place reserved for hunting, at great distance
and under unfavorable light conditions. So might a man be heard to say that
he believed he did no wrong in abbreviating the life of a friend who had but a
short time to live, in order to save him from extreme suffering. As in the case
of the hunter it might be deemed significant that his companions shared his
optical illusion, so in the case of the mercy killer it might be considered rele-
vant that many other persons of his environment shared his legal illusion.
Thus a significant question in judging a claim of legal error is: "Is he alone
ignorant of that which everybody in the State knows?"2 45 By "State" we
must mean the life environment of the accused; thus it was deemed important
in a German case246 that the defendants' error was shared by the local mayor.
this rule inapplicable, under a special legislation, where the personal conviction is contrary
not to the particular provisions of the law but rather to the prevailing legal system as a
whole, for "otherwise the State would be sacrificing its constitutional system and giving
up its own existence." Ibid., at 183. Defendants, convicted of violating a law dissolving the
Communist Party-the purpose of which party was forcibly to overthrow the government-
contended that they were motivated by the honorable motive of "idealism."
' Of course, obstruction of knowledge by unconscious desires to be punished cannot be
taken into account in normal cases.
Quid enim, si omnes in civitate sciant, quod Me solus ignorat?" Digest, 22.6.9.2.
2' Consult discussion at 457 supra.
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Proof of knowledge of law might be adduced by showing that representatives
of the group to which the accused belongs have the required knowledge and
that he is not more handicapped in acquiring such knowledge than others. If
the accused suffers from a special handicap, for example, if his intelligence is
below average, he cannot be expected to know that which average people of
his group may know, and it may not be inferred that he shared their knowl-
edge of law. Difficulty of proof, if any, is no reason for reversing the burden
of proof-for that would be, in effect, a rejection of the presumption of inno-
cence. The burden of proof may be reversed, however, where the accused erred
regarding the availability of a justification ground rather than regarding the
legal prohibition. Such a case is analogous to that in which the accused be-
lieves in the presence of facts which would render his otherwise illegal conduct
lawful.
24 7
As between the theory of intent (psychological guilt) and the theory of
guilt (normative guilt) which have played such important roles in the de-
velopment of Swiss and German law, it would appear-judging by the policy
advocated by us-that we give preference to the latter theory. Actually, how-
ever, we are not hampered by strict adherence to either of these theories. The
theory of intent is based on the unrealistic assumption that there is in modern
law a uniform notion of intent that comprises certain constant elements as
part of its nature. The theory of guilt, while allowing greater flexibility, is
equally dogmatic. The idea of responsibility set forth in this paper is not
predicated upon either theory, but is rather built upon an independent,
avowedly political, ideological basis.
However, as repeatedly emphasized, responsibility thus conceived requires
consistency in distributing justice. From this point of view we are concerned
with the problem of differentiating error of law from error of fact, which has
been a frequent source of puzzling results. Should our suggestions regarding
error of law be accepted while the present rule on error of fact is maintained,
that problem would require solution. Perhaps the rule on error of fact should
be amended to accord with the suggested rule on error of law.
The policy suggested in this article may be summarized thus: Any re-
straint imposed upon man is, in a sense, offensive to human dignity. The aim
of free society is hence to reduce legal restraint to the minimum required in a
given situation. Restraint is less undignified when imposed upon conscious
nonconformance with law. Subjection of man to sanctions under a law which
is unknown and unknowable to him and which he has no opportunity to ac-
cept or to reject expresses the view that he is a mere object of the law. We be-
lieve, however, that in a democratic society man is the ultimate end of the
law.
. Consult McKelvey on Evidence 94 (5th ed., 1944).
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